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Abstract 
Title:   Value Creating or Value Destroying? A Study of Cash Flow 
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Purpose:   This study develops prior academic finding from Brian, James 
and George (2008) by specific empirical tests in two comparable 
industries – U.S. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology. 
Methodology:   Quantitative approach using multiple regression tests 
Theoretical Perspectives:  The theoretical frameworks cover the theories underlying 
earning management and risk management, mainly regarding 
cash flow volatility, earnings volatility, accruals management, 
and valuations. We also present the conflicts between prior 
empirical studies and Merton model and using an eclectic 
approach to explain both sides and eliminate the conflicts. 
Empirical foundation:  Samples contains all U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
firms from 2001 to 2010 with missing data no more than two 
years, the number of samples are 70 and 83 separately. 
Conclusions:   The cash flow volatility could be either value destroying or value 
creating. It is also meaningful to classify the firms by growth 
options when analysis the firm value. These results develop the 
prior study to a more specification condition. Managers should 
focus on real cash flow management and the effects of firm’s 
earning management should also be measured by cash flow 
rather than accruals. 
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Part I. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Earning management is a shadow behind the shining numbers of financial reports. 
Although it is hard to say if it is beneficial to every stakeholder, the masked numbers 
keep us away from the truth. There are many researchers make effort to detect the 
trace of them from accounting tricks and measure the effects of them to get a better 
understand of the true value of the firms. There are evidences showing that cash 
flow volatility, accruals and earning volatility could be signs for earning management. 
In other words, the volatility could be a key to discover the trick of earning 
management. On the other hand, our world becomes much more uncertain in recent 
ten years, and so does the business world. The terrorist attack on September 11th 
2001 in U.S. led world airline industry into the largest crisis it has ever met. The war 
in Iraq in 2003 highly raised the fuel price and deeply hurt industries related to it like 
energy and car manufactory. In 2005, the terrible earth quake and tsunami badly 
affected the economies of Southeast Asia. The failure of U.S. house sector in 2008 
and overusing of financial derivatives heavily struck the global economy once again. 
Not yet recovering from the last global financial crisis, the earthquake in Japan in 
2011 and the followed explosion at the world largest nuclear power plant Fukushima 
hurt global food, tourism, fishing and energy market again. Challenged by these 
uncertainties, nowadays firms are meeting with more volatility, and so does their 
performances. Thus these leave more motivations and flexibilities for firms to 
manipulate their earnings. It is questionable if the earning management behaves 
differently under such uncertain background recent years when compared with late 
20th century. Moreover, accounting standard and information transparency is 
developing quickly in recent, people question more on earning management 
activities these years. There are still quite a lot of unknown spaces for us to explore 
and exploit in the field of volatility and earning management. 
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1.2. Problem Discussion 
 
As one of the most important measurements for investors’ decisions making, 
volatility has been studied for a long time. There are different kinds of volatility, in 
which cash flow volatility is widely used in theoretical studies as a measurement. 
Nowaday’s corporate risk management theory prefers that firms with less volatility 
supervise companies with high volatility from many aspects. For instance, following 
the Pecking Order Theory, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein(1993) found that smooth cash 
flow firm could rely on a more stable internal finance when facing attractive 
investment opportunities thus reducing the cost of external finance. John and 
Clifford(1999) illustrated that hedging, through reducing volatility, could help firm to 
lower its expected tax liability largely. Smooth cash flow firms are more unlikely to 
meet with financial distress thus reduce the risk of bankruptcy. They are also 
preferred by investors due to the ability to repay debt as schedule and being more 
able to bear potential strikes. Investors, credit rating companies and analysts also 
prefer smooth cash flow companies since less volatile represents less risk (Badrinath, 
Gay, and Kale 1989). Thus companies with smooth performance will have a relatively 
higher value due to lower discounting rate and lower weight average cost of capital 
(Trueman and Titman, 1988; J.Peter Ferderer 1993).  
 
However, there are also other arguements that support value creation from volatility. 
One important theoretical model is Merton Model. Merton(1974) illustrated that 
equity could be considered as a call option of firm’s total assets, and the volatility 
reflects potential growth of the assets in this model. In this way, volatility should be 
value enhancing. Merton Model has significant influence on later researches yet still 
no empirical study could directly reject this result. There are also other researches 
like Pastor and Veronesi(2003) argue that volatilities reflect firm’s future potential 
growth opportunities and higher volatility is related with higher potential growth, 
thus volatility could create value. 
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Brian, James and George (2008), focusing on over 4,000 U.S. listed firm, checked the 
relations between cash flow volatility and firm value by using multiple regression 
tests. This is the first research that directly examined the quantitative relations 
between volatility and enterprise value since former studies focused on this topic 
from other perspectives like hedging or taxation. However, the results showed that 
cash flow volatility is negatively related with firm value while systematic risk is 
positively related with firm value. In this way, the results could not directly reject that 
volatility could create value. From our point of view, we think that there exist both 
value creation and destruction, but value destruction from volatility is larger than the 
value creation from potential growth in their study. While different opinions are held 
by researchers, still no enough evidence could illustrate which opinion is right or 
wrong. Thus one purpose of our study is to examine whether volatility is value 
creating or value destroying, or as our expectation, both at the same time. 
 
Brian, James and George (2008) also contributed to theories of earning management. 
Traditionally, researchers think that managers could use accruals to reduce volatility 
which is preferred by investors thus it creates value. In this way, only financial 
statements volatilities after accruals matter. However, this is challenged by some 
recent studies like Leuz, Nanda and Wysochi(2003). In Brian, James and George 
(2008), they found that earning managements could only create value by real cash 
flow managements but not through accruals and reservations. Thus, this research 
illustrated that cash flow volatility has direct impact on firm value, but not through 
accruals. However, there are also some studies argue that the real effect of accruals 
could only be examined by samples within same industry but not from a general 
level. 
 
Since few studies has been done to study the quantitative relations between cash 
flow volatility and firm value within specific industries and, as mentioned above, it is 
necessary to check accruals’ influence on firm value on an industry basis, the other 
two purposes of our study are (1)to examine different industries in U.S. market to 
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check the relations between earnings volatility, cash flow volatility, accruals volatility 
and firm value and (2) to see if these relations differs between industries, or to be 
more exactly, between mature industries (which are usually assets-intensive) and 
high growth industries (which are usually non-assets-intensive and highly volatile). To 
compare these two industries, we also expected to check the effect of possibly 
volatility behaviors between assets-intensive and non-assets-intensive, mature and 
high growth companies.  
 
We also observed one knowledge gap which lays in today’s corporate risk 
management theories. Although most of the studies illustrated that there are 
correlations between volatilities and firm value, few empirical studies have been 
down to check how the value is influenced. Thus, in our study, we also follow the 
theoretical framework to check two possible ways for cash flow volatility to affect 
firm value: taxation and possible financial distress. 
 
1.3. Research Purpose 
 
As mentioned above, we identify some gaps and conflicts lying in different 
theoretical frameworks and empirical studies. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the following four questions: 
 
(1) Whether cash flow volatility has different impacts on mature and high growth 
industries? 
(2) Whether cash flow volatility has direct influence on firm value but not through 
accruals management? 
(3) Whether volatility creates value or destruct value? 
(4) If cash flow volatility destroy value, how? (This do not deny possible value 
creation) 
 
These four questions are highly related to each other and all point to a study basing 
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on an industry level. We think that we are able to examine all four questions with our 
sample at the same time, and only do we examine all these factors could we get 
access to integrated answers of cash flow volatility’s effect on firm. Our estimations 
and their potential relations are: 
 
(1) We believe that Merton(1974) should be right since no empirical study could 
directly challenge the result till now. Thus we expect to see different impacts 
from cash flow volatility on industries with different growth option. We expect to 
see a positive or at least a less negative coefficient in high growth industry than in 
mature industry. 
(2) If our assumption that there exist differences between industries is right, then we 
could further observe whether volatility is value creating or value destroying. We 
expect to see both at the same time since we believe that Merton Model is right. 
Further explanations could be found in section 2.5. 
(3) If our estimation (2) is right, then we need to check again whether accrual creates 
value or not. Since there are argues that accrual’s effect could only be examined 
on an industry level, we estimate that there might exists difference between our 
study and former studies like Brian, James and George (2008). 
(4) We believe that cash flow volatility has impacts on firm value. However, we are 
also curious about factors besides accruals which may affect this influence. Thus 
we add new variables and test whetheer there is any improvement of the model 
or not. We expected to see an improvement by introducing variables like tax rate 
and annual interest payments. 
 
1.4. Delimitations 
 
The major delimitations of this paper are: (1) Sample size: compared with former 
studies, we focus on relations of cash flows, accruals and firm value in specific 
industries (U.S. biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries). Following Brian, James 
and George (2008), we also use strict criteria to select samples. These two reasons 
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lead to a large reduction of the size of sample base: total 602 firms in our study when 
compared with over 4000 firms in Brian, James and George (2008). We believe that 
the results are robust within U.S. healthcare market. Although our samples also 
contain foreign firms that are listed in U.S., it is hard to infer whether the results are 
generally correct in other countries and other markets due to the sample selection. 
(2) Time period: when compared with Brian, James and George (2008), we choose a 
more recent time period to examine if there are any new changes in results. However, 
this means that we could not exclude the influences from global financial crisis, 
terrorist attacks etc. which are treated as “potential severe serial correlation” in 
Brian, James and George (2008). However, we think that these factors better reflect 
the real situation of today’s world, thus could be treated as an irreversible change in 
firms’ systematic and idiosyncratic risks. 
 
1.5. Thesis Outline 
 
Our study is organized as follow: In Chapter II, we review both theoretical and 
empirical literatures related to this topic, mainly focus on the relations among cash 
flow, accruals, and firm value. We introduce readers about the gaps and conflicts 
lying among different theoretical frameworks and empirical studies and present how 
we come up with our research questions. Chapter III describes our sample selections 
and methodology to support the research together with explaining the choice of 
variables, the robustness of models we used and our expectations. Chapter IV 
presents our tests of relations among cash flow, accruals and enterprise value. In this 
chapter we also discuss the results and provide readers reasonable answers to our 
questions. Chapter V summarizes the study and gives conclusions. In Appendix, we 
give out Pearson correlation tests and selected multiple regression results that are 
highly meaningful. 
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Part II. Literature review 
2.1. Introduction for earning management 
Earning is an important object of management and manipulation. Joshua and Varda 
(2008) present three approaches to state that: the contracting approach, the 
decision making approach, and the legal approach. The contracting approach states 
that, earnings provide summary information which is used for designing the contract 
among different stakeholders. The decision making approach states earning provides 
valuable information for making decision. The legal approach states earning provide 
valuable information for shareholders to control management more effectively. To 
sum up, we conclude that earning is essential for different stakeholders. There are 
many business activities referring to earning as a critical measurement. Since earning 
is important, management has various motivations to manipulate earnings. The term 
earning management is introduced to describe the activities of manipulating 
financial report in order to smooth the earning. The target could be various, but the 
ultimate target is to provide the “twisted” information for certain purpose. There are 
several important studies that defined earning management: 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) defined earning management as follows: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual out comes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.  
However, Joshua and Varda (2008, p. 27) point out two weaknesses against Healy 
and Wahlen. First, it does not set a clear boundary between earnings management 
and normal activities whose output is earnings. Second, not all earnings 
management is misleading. Therefore, they developed the definition as follows: 
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Earnings management is a collection of managerial decisions that result 
in not reporting the true short-term, value-maximizing earnings as known 
to management. 
Earnings management can be 
Beneficial: it signals long-term value; 
Pernicious: it conceals short- or long-term value; 
Neutral: it reveals the short-term true performance. 
The managed earnings result from taking production/investment actions 
before earnings are realized, or making accounting choices that affect the 
earnings numbers and their interpretation after the true earnings are 
realized. 
Based on the definition above, earning management should not only be fraud like 
and harmful for investors, but also be beneficial to either management or investors. 
In our study, we concentrate more on the final outcome based on our empirical 
evidence under certain conditions, rather than discuss the overall framework of the 
nature of earning management. We expect such a study will enhance or challenge 
the explanation of certain feature of earning management. Regardless the confusion 
between earning management and normal activities, we also expect to investigate 
the value creation by earning management under our assumptions which we will 
discuss later.  
2.2. The methods of earning management 
On practical level, earning managements require a variety of accounting and 
financial technics. Vast number of studies has summarized earning management 
through following methods1: 
                                                             
1 Joshua Ronen and Varda Yaari (2008). EARNINGS MANAGEMENT. New York: Springer 
Science+Business Media, LLC. 31-33. 
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(1) Accounting choice under GAAP, such as LIFO versus FIFO for inventory 
valuation, depreciation. 
(2) The timing of the adoption of a new standard. 
(3) The estimates required by GAAP, such as depreciation, the allowance for bad 
debt, assets valuation, pension accounting and asset write offs. 
(4) A classification of items as above or below the line of operating earnings. 
(5) Structuring transactions to achieve desired accounting outcomes. 
(6) Timing the recognition of revenues and expenses. 
(7) A real production and investment decision, such as reducing research and 
development expenditures and affecting selling and adminsitrative expenses. 
(8) Managing the transparency of the presentation.  
(9) Managing the informativeness of earnings through various means. 
Through the previous studies, we sum up that the most common accounting method 
of earing management is either report the future income in present period or 
manipulate the cost reported. And the most common real smooth is making 
investment. As we mentioned before, we have no ambition to describe the detailed 
process of earning management. Instead, we could at least speculate that cash flow 
and abnormal accruals are the focuses for our study to investigate since the 
accounting method is expected to create a time gap between cash flow and 
accounting recognition and the real smooth is expected to influence the relation 
between cash flow and economic earning.  
2.3. Detecting earning management 
There are many studies made effort to detect earning management. The most 
common used method is detecting the abnormal accruals. One of the most 
important contributions is the method developed by Jones (1991) which is to detect 
the abnormal accrual between estimation stage and event stage. Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995), Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003), Kang and Sivaramakrishnan 
(1995), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Leone, and Wasley (2005), Ye (2006) developed 
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and modified Jones model by either adding controls or addressing non-linear 
relationship. 
However, there still exists the basic problem which is to distinguish earning 
management from normal activities. Elgers, Pfeiffer, and Porter (2003, p. 406) state, 
“A fundamental issue in assessing earnings management is the unobservability of the 
managed and un-managed components of reported earnings.”  
Sloan (1996), Collins and Hribar (2000), and Core, Guay, Richardson, and Verdi (2006), 
found that the market do not distinguish between cash flow and accruals.  Further 
studies from Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001), Ahmed, Nainar, and Zhou 
(2005), indicated that even the analysts and auditors also do not distinguish them 
correctly. To explain the mispricing problem, Beneish and Nichols (2005), indicated 
that since investors cannot pierce the veil of accruals, they perceive the inflated 
earnings (as reflected in high accruals) as a signal of future high earnings instead of a 
warning of a reversal that will lead to a decline in reported earnings.2 Beneish and 
Vargus (2002) explain the mispricing by insider trading which suggest that the 
investors cannot distinguish positive accruals from abnormal trading.  
Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2002) examined the relationships between accruals 
and cash flows and assets. They found that accruals are less persistent than 
operating cash flows in predicting 1-year-ahead return on assets, while accruals and 
cash flows have equivalent associations with 1-year-ahead operating income. The 
studies from Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2004), Papanastasopoulos, 
Thomakos, and Wang (2007), discussed the issue further and consider the mispricing 
is the result of a more broadly anomaly reason. Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan 
(2006), showed that the payments to equity holders have a more important role. 
Atwood and Xie (2005) showed that accruals and special items are strongly positively 
related. However, special items affect the extent to which the market overprices 
                                                             
2
 Joshua Ronen and Varda Yaari (2008). EARNINGS MANAGEMENT. New York: Springer 
Science+Business Media, LLC. 385. 
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accruals with negative special items aggravating and positive special items 
alleviating accruals overpricing.  
To sum up, using accruals as the measurement of earning management is not 
precisely enough. Further measurements should be introduced to describe the 
earning management activities more accuracy and lead to less misunderstanding for 
the investors. To discover that, it is rational to test the reaction from investors and 
the controls select as the proxies of earning management. The market value of the 
firms could be a proper proxy as the reaction from investors in certain market. 
2.4. Arguments of cash flow volatility 
Since the market does not react to the earning management as we expected, we 
consider that it is more important to concentrate on the direct relations between 
accruals, cash flow, and market. One of the purposes of detecting earning 
management is to discover the real information to support the investment decision 
for investors. Studies which indicate the direct relationship between objective items, 
such as cash flow, and market should be more helpful for this purpose and as long as 
we could not clearly describe the relationship between accruals and market, it is 
worth to try another way. 
Generally speaking, since the detection of earning management is done by abnormal 
accruals, the relationship between cash flow and accruals comes firstly. Day and 
Fahey (1988) mentioned that cash flow volatility is one of the drivers of shareholder 
value. The empirical evidence from Keith and Mark (1993) also indicate significant 
coefficient between cash flow and market value. These two studies indicate the 
market would response to the cash flow by either positive or negative, and Tobin’s q 
should relate to the cash flow as well. 
Wang et al. (1993) discovered that the earnings response coefficient is smaller when 
earnings contain a large change in total accruals. Alister, Susan and Terry (2000) 
conclude the lower earnings volatility is associated with higher market value by a 
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sample of 2225 firms from 1983 to 1992. They also conclude that earnings volatility 
is informative to cash flow volatility, as well as the accruals. Randolph, Paul and 
Tuomo (2002) mentioned that there are many literatures suggest the stock prices of 
firms are “underreact” to the news of future cash flow. In their research they 
couldn’t reject this conclusion, but they do provide evidence that market response 
positively to the positive cash flow news. By summarizing above mentioned studies, 
the market response, or Tobin’s q should prefer less risky conditions which could 
present as lower cash flow volatility rather than the accruals. It is probably consistent 
with the finding from Shin and Stulz (2000), which is Tobin’s q is negatively correlated 
to the total equity risk. The less total equity risk could also lead to a lower volatility of 
the firm equity, which could also have lower cash flow volatility.  
Furthermore, Dechow (1994) notes that there is a strong negative correlation 
between accruals and cash flows and build a model to explain that. It could be a sign 
of earning management which is the cash flow would be converted to earnings in 
order to smooth the report. Their study also enlightens the researchers to better 
specification the accrual models such as Jone’s.  
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) further note that the more negative the correlation 
between cash flows and accruals the more smoothing the firm is doing via accruals, 
which does not necessarily reflect the underlying economic performance of the firm. 
We could speculate that the change of cash flows will effect on the accruals, which 
will further lead to potential earning management. However, there are still vast 
number of studies mentioned above indicated the mispricing problems, which 
suggest the accruals may not indicate the correct market response. As a result, the 
value creation is also questionable since the market response may not support that. 
All of the studies mentioned above lead to a same direction. To discover the relation 
between the market response and possibly earning management activities, it is 
better to examine the direct linkage between cash flow and market value of the firms. 
Some of studies also confirm the relationship between cash flow volatility and firm 
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value. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) illustrates that low cash flows volatility can 
create value.  There are evidence points towards investors preferring smooth cash 
flows in making capital allocation decisions (Brian, James and George, 2008).  
Moreover, Brian, James and George (2008) show empirical evidence of cash flow 
volatility is negatively valued by investors. And the earnings smoothing via accruals 
does not add value. This study suggest we could ignore distinguish between cash 
flow and accruals. The managers create market premiums through smooth real cash 
flow rather than smooth accruals. 
The study of Brian, James and George (2008) is essential. It directly relate the cash 
flow to firm value, and deny the value creation through accruals. It suggests we 
should focus on smooth cash flow rather than smooth earning through smooth 
accruals. However, they use the cross section samples which could be questioned. 
The accruals measured among different industries may neutralize since the level of 
accruals are different. Therefore, their conclusion that the accruals will not create 
value is questionable. It is also questionable if the specification of firms is necessary 
for the research of relationship between cash flow and firm value. 
Furthermore, Gul, Leung, and Srinidhi (2002), find that managers of firms with 
greater investment opportunities use earnings management to signal future 
opportunities for growth. There rises further question that as long as the behavior of 
high growth firms is different, is there any neutralize problem? Is the research on 
high growth firms different from Brian, James and George’s conclusion? 
2.5. Arguments of relations between cash flow volatility and firm value 
Cash flow volatility is widely used in theoretical studies as a measure of risk.  As one 
of the most important measurement for investors’ decisions making, volatility has 
been studied for long time. However, there exist conflicts and gaps between different 
studies and researches about relations between cash flow volatility and firm value. In 
1974, Robert C. Merton published his model to measuring credit risks. In this model, 
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equity is treated as a call option of assets while volatility measures potential assets 
growth. In this way volatility should be value enhancing. Pastor and Veronesi(2003) 
argues that volatility reflects future potential growth opportunities, which means 
that companies with higher volatilities should growth faster thus have higher value 
since the firm value consist of assets in place and growth opportunities. Thus in their 
study, there exists positive correlation between volatility and firm value.  
However, these results are challenged, although not directly, by some recent 
empirical studies like Froot, Scharfstein and Stein(1993), John and Clifford(1999), 
Shin and Stulz (2000) and Brian, James and George (2008). The former two studies 
illustrates that firm could create value through methods like hedging that could 
reduce volatility. In the latter two studies, the volatilities from integrated risks are 
negatively correlated with firm value3 when using Tobin’s Q as proxy of EV.  
 However, no direct and “powerful” explanation is given out yet from those studies. 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein(1993) and John and Clifford(1999) only proved that 
lowering volatility could create value, however it is not so logic to derive from this 
result to say high volatility must destruct value, one could argue that higher volatility 
could also create value but lower volatility creates more. When it comes to Shin and 
Stulz (2000), the results highly relied on regression specification and did not apply to 
largest companies. While Brian, James and George (2008)’s result is quite robust 
regardless of regression specification, it could not directly “reject the positive effect 
of volatility on firm value as argued by Merton (1974) or Pastor and Veronesi(2003)”4. 
One possible answer is that there exist both value creation and destruction at the 
                                                             
3 It means the integrated effect on EV from both systematic and non-systematic risks. In 
both Shin and Stulz (2000) and Brian, James and George (2008), they found positive 
correlations between changes in systematic risk and changes in Tobin’s Q while a negative 
correlation between changes in unsystematic risk and changes in Q and finally leads to a 
negative correlation between integrated risk, which includes systematic and non-systematic 
risks, and the changes in Tobin’s Q, mainly due to that idiosyncratic risks are generally larger 
than systematic risks. 
4
 See Brian, James and George (2008), “Do investors value smooth performance?”, Page 249 
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same time however the value destruction from cash flow volatility is much larger 
than the value creation from growth opportunities (see figure 2). In our tests, we will 
examine if this is true. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value Creation 
Value Destruction 
Value increasing from growth opportunities 
and 
value destructing from volatilities 
Value increasing from growth opportunities 
Figure 2 – Explanation to the negative correlations between volatility and EV 
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Part III. Methodology 
 
3.1. Industry selection 
 
We select our samples from U.S. listed firms, since the mature capital market and 
regulation could offer us more reliable resources, and the huge number of 
companies’ base could provide broadly information. The accessibility of information 
from US listed companies is expected to be easier since the statistical data based on 
US market is vast. The other reason is that, since there are lots of related researches 
that have been done basing on U.S. firms, the results of our study will be much more 
comparable with former studies by reducing problems caused by using different 
accounting standards or some other country specific factors. 
 
Our target is to compare the relationships of cash flow volatility and firm value 
between high growth firms and mature firms, including various controls required by 
Tobin’s Q. We need to select two industries which have similar business model, 
target market, but with different growth rate. As a result, it is more convincible to 
illustrate and compare the effects of cash flow volatility on firms with different 
growth rates. Pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries fit exactly with our 
requirements since these industries are strongly related in business model, and the 
target markets are expected to be similar. Additionally, biotechnology industry is 
described as a high growth industry from many resources. For example, Biological 
technicians, a key biotechnology occupation, is expected to grow by 28.2 percent 
between 2004 and 2014, while the occupation of biological scientists is projected to 
grow by 17.0 percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Employment Data). 
The pharmaceutical industry have a much lower P/E and much high market cap along 
with less number of companies(Yahoo finance industry center). It indicates that 
pharmaceutical industry is more mature than biotech companies. The growth of drug 
manufacture industry is also related to the R&D provided by the biotech industry 
- 21- 
 
which suggests the growth of drug manufacture industry is a follower highly relies on 
biotechnology industry. The basic comparisons of the two industries are in Table 1: 
 
Table 1 
This table compares main differences of U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies. 5 
 Pharmaceutical Biotechnology 
Growth Mature, low growth options High growth 
Cash position Usually cash cow Cash limited 
R&D Relying more on partnerships Self R&D development 
Risks Lower volatility, higher flexibility Higher volatility 
Asset  Assets-intensive Non-assets-intensive 
Financing Better access to capital market Costly to get external financing 
 
3.2. Sample Selection 
 
There are total 286 listed firms in U.S. pharmaceutical industry and 316 listed firms in 
U.S. biotechnology industry. Our initial sample includes firms within these two 
industries with non-missing annual data for total assets and total revenues6 for at 
least 8 out of 10 years from 2001-01-01 to 2010-12-31 which reduces the sample size 
of these two industries to 70 (pharmaceutical) and 96 (biotechnology) firms 
separately. All data are extracted from DataStream. There are three main distinctions 
in sample selections between BJG2008 and our study: 
 
(1) BJG2008’s research is based on all U.S. listed firms with quarterly data while 
our study is based on annual data. The reason is that we could not find 
enough quarterly data from the database to support us, especially when it 
                                                             
5
 The table is summarized by Fanding Li and Bo Cheng. 
6
 The reasons to choose these two items are: (1) they are the basis to measure most of our regression 
variables and (2) other data are usually available if firms have these two data. 
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comes to cash flow from operations (CFO), only annual data could be found. 
There are at first two alternatives for us to choose, the first one is to random 
select 50 to 100 firms in each industry and hand collecting the data. However, 
we still do not think that the selected sample will have enough explanation 
power to convince us that the results represent the real situation of the 
whole industries. Thus we turned to the other alternative to base on an 
annual data. We think that this alternative is more reasonable due to: (i) firms 
tend to use more accruals at the end of the year to dress the annual reports, 
but not for every quarterly report, so this won’t bring big differences to our 
study; (ii) the trend should be similar no matter basing on annual data or 
quarterly data; (iii) by using annual data, we could choose all firms meet with 
our criteria and reject problems linked with random selection; and (iv) the 
nature of our study imposes strong data requirements, the first alternative 
may not contain enough samples and observations after exclude data that do 
not meet with our requirements. 
 
(2) BJG2008 has a much larger sample basis so it is able for them to collect data 
without any missing data of total sales and total assets. However, since we 
only focus on two industries which largely reduce the sample basis, we allow 
at most two missing annual data of total assets and total sales out of the ten 
years. Then we will hand collecting missing data from U.S. SEC’s website7. The 
only exceptions are: (i) the IPO for the firm was in 2002 or 2003 and (ii) the 
firm filled bankruptcy or was privatized in 2009 or 2010. In these two 
circumstances, we keep the company in our sample with one or two years’ 
missing data8 and the data are noted as “None”. We exclude all other data 
that do not meet with requirements mentioned in this paragraph. 
 
                                                             
7
 http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
8
 The final results showed that no more than 5 of these kinds of firms are included for each industry 
(or less than 0.5% of all observations). Thus the missing data won’t affect our final regression results. 
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(3) BJG2008 focuses on a time period of 1987 to 2002 since they want to reduce 
possible outside factors like global financial factors which may affect the 
regression results. However, we choose to study companies from 2001 to 
2010. We think that this time period better reflect the real risks in nowaday’s 
business environment. Firms are not in theoretical contexts like perfect 
competition and stable outside environment. They could not choose to avoid 
risks like global financial crisis and they must to face the reality of a more 
volatile world. By choosing year from 2001 to 2010, we could have a better 
understand of the volatilities’ impacts on companies and how earnings 
management can really create value. 
 
There is still one thing to note: due to the methods we used to calculate sales growth, 
earnings volatility, cash flow volatility and accruals volatility, the observations that 
are finally used in our regression tests are from year 2002 and 2010. We also 
excluded extremely abnormal data, this leads to a final cross-sections of 70 and 
observations of no less than 555 in all regression tests of U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry and no less than 505 in all regression tests of U.S. biotechnology industry. 
The similar observations sizes for both industries ensure us to make the results 
comparable. The analysis of our samples’ and results’ reliability and robustness could 
be found in Part IV, namely “Analysis”. Table 2 and Table 3 present the summary 
statistics of our samples and observations. 
 
3.3. Cash flow volatility and firm value in specific industries 
 
Most of the empirical studies have been done by multiple regressions to see the 
effect of earnings volatility / cash flow volatility on firm value, however, few focused 
on cash flow volatility in specific industries. We expected that there exist differences 
between different industries, and cash flow volatilities will have more influence on 
firms within non-assets-intensive industries like biotech. Since assets-intensive 
industries are usually quite mature, firms within those industries have more assets 
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Table 2 
In this table we present summary statistics of our samples and observations for U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry. 
U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry 
Variables Mean Std. 25% Median 75% 
Tobin’s Q 2.122106 26.96658 0.225276 0.411045 0.648616 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) -2.94946 2.423887 -5.31685 -2.23853 -1.13615 
Earnings per share -0.38474 3.059358 -0.7525 -0.11 0.48225 
Earnings volatility 1.91629 12.67697 0.248975 0.514389 1.142857 
Ln (Earnings volatility) -0.59287 1.357417 -1.36342 -0.6213 0.15345 
Cash flow per share 0.197813 2.226403 -0.46575 -0.029 0.99575 
CF volatility 1.448976 4.704773 0.18301 0.454472 1.050716 
Ln (CF volatility) -0.83138 1.485709 -1.68201 -0.7864 0.051118 
Systematic risk 0.686063 0.880327 0.120174 0.477857 0.921757 
Ln (Sys. Risk) -1.41237 2.066423 -2.11883 -0.73844 -0.08147 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.005997 0.029684 0.000541 0.001602 0.003755 
Ln (Idio. Risk) -6.53107 1.560382 -7.52139 -6.4362 -5.5848 
Total assets 5349109 20131146 15513 69707.5 489589.8 
Ln (Total assets) 11.45199 2.9655 9.725258 11.16246 13.1058 
Sales growth 21.29867 487.4779 -0.07502 0.115883 0.42247 
Return on assets -16.4094 50.89984 -19.91 -0.3219 0.2223 
Capex-to-sales 0.866258 10.52867 0.010329 0.034969 0.07346 
R&D-to-sales 15.14642 213.2562 0.085433 0.216863 1.180533 
SG&A-to-sales 29.03671 353.6062 0.451075 0.781903 2.366054 
Leverage: D/E 88.88512 1636.941 0.000 7.990983 36.98703 
Interest Expenses 0.040521 0.728832 0.000 0.000 0.221898 
Effective Tax Rate 1.722998 30.79698 0.000 0.010961 0.050585 
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Table 3 
In this table we present summary statistics of our samples and observations for U.S. 
biotechnology industry.  
U.S. Biotechnology Industry 
Variables Mean Std. 25% Median 75% 
Tobin’s Q 1.097362 4.647385 0.165199 0.337549 0.674859 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) -1.01816 1.21945 -1.77806 -1.07977 -0.3724 
Earnings per share -1.77383 9.317634 -1.5056 -0.5338 -0.09911 
Earnings volatility 1.638308 12.5947 0.17797 0.37796 0.79229 
Ln (Earnings volatility) -1.01465 1.49747 -1.72613 -0.97296 -0.23283 
Cash flow per share -1.18756 7.672351 -0.99263 -0.30437 -0.00618 
CF volatility 1.86044 23.9416 0.17019 0.38762 0.8399 
Ln (CF volatility) -0.9832 1.46898 -1.77081 -0.94774 -0.17447 
Systematic risk 0.752158 0.764438 0.131467 0.540833 1.164978 
Ln (Sys. Risk) -1.21609 1.927644 -2.029 -0.61465 0.1527 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.006401 0.08879 0.000826 0.001586 0.003332 
Ln (Idio. Risk) -6.36951 1.153085 -7.09473 -6.4461 -5.69849 
Total assets 725445.8 3424630 22089 83722.5 293369.5 
Ln (Total assets) 11.20231 2.190796 10.00278 11.33526 12.58918 
Sales growth 1.837903 19.65758 -0.17845 0.107554 0.492375 
Return on assets -55.2634 118.4367 -63.8375 -29.645 -5.7225 
Capex-to-sales 2.038895 23.80021 0.033183 0.090067 0.261357 
R&D-to-sales 29.15617 284.8935 0.171414 0.781759 3.27721 
SG&A-to-sales 47.9434 480.9395 0.631864 1.677121 6.036363 
Leverage: D/E 67.44257 2399.596 0.000 0.805 26.0875 
Interest Expenses 7120.079 35288.72 10.00 306.5 3245.5 
Effective Tax Rate 0.069319 0.419892 0.000 0.000 0.005089 
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and higher cash position, and they usually get access to capital market much cheaper 
and easier. However, for industries like biotech, firms within those industries usually 
have high R&D expenditures and need more cash to catch potential opportunities, 
but they usually have less assets and more future uncertainty and financial distress, 
thus it is more difficult for those firms to get access to capital markets when 
compared with firms in mature industries. In this way, we expect that cash flow 
volatilities affect more in non-assets-intensive industries. 
 
 
Followed Brian, James and George (2008), we believe that earnings volatility also has 
a significantly negative coefficient correlation with firm value and the influence 
matters to the extent of its effect on underlying cash flow volatility.9 So in our 
research, we start from the effect of cash flow volatility and build up the regression 
model by using variables as follow: 
 
Tobin′s Q = α + 𝛽
1
∙ ln(𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽
2
∙ ln(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)        + 𝛽
3
∙ ln(𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) + 𝛽
4
∙ ln(Total assets) + 𝛽
5
∙ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽
6
∙ 𝑔
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽
7
∙
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽
8
∙
𝑅&𝐷
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽
9
∙
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
       + 𝛽
10
∙ Leverage + 𝛽
11
∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜀 
 
 
 
The method of using firm’s market-to-book ratio as a simple approximation of Tobin’s 
                                                             
9 Brian, James and George also checked the robustness of their results in the journal 
“Do investors value smooth performance”. The result is robust “regardless of estimation 
technique or particular regression specification”. For instance, they used both EPS including 
and excluding extraordinary items as measurement of earnings volatility and got similar 
result that earnings volatility negatively affects firm value to the extent of its influence on 
real cash flow volatility. Generally, we followed their result and, one step more, to check 
specific industries and try to explain how cash flow volatility affects enterprise value later. 
Model 1 – Multiple Regression Model without New Variables 
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Q to reflect firm value is widely used in former empirical studies: 
 
Tobin′s Q =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
We also follow and adjust variables used in Lang and Stulz(1994) and Allayannis and 
Weston(2001) and Brian, James and George (2008) to support our research: 
 
(1) Cash-flow volatility (𝜎𝐶𝐹): we use the natural logarithm of net cash flow from 
operations (CFO) over the sum of common and prefer stocks outstanding (and 
adjustment of stock splits) to get comparable CF per share and using the formula 
𝜎𝐶𝐹 = (𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑡−1)/𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 to measure quarterly cash flow volatility. 
All data are from firms’ quarterly cash flows statements, item “Cash Flow from 
Operations”. By using CFO but not including cash flow from financial activities, we 
reduced the possibility of managers’ control of cash flow by increasing or 
decreasing extra expenditures artificially and maybe unethically or illegally, which 
may affect our research results. 
 
(2) Systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk: In theoretical valuation framework, the 
firm’s value could be discomposed into two parts: the value of asset in place and 
the value of future growth opportunities. Generally speaking, the value of future 
growth opportunities is in line with expected risks for firm to bear. This is 
reflected by discounting future cash flow at weight average cost of capital. We 
followed Shin and Stulz (2000) and use the Market Model to estimate both 
systematic and unsystematic (or to say idiosyncratic) risks: 
𝑅𝑖𝑗 =  𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅(𝑚)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                          
Systematic Risk =  ln * 𝛽𝑗
2 + 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝑅(𝑚)𝑖-+ 
Idiosyncratic Risk =  ln * 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒[𝜀𝑖𝑗] +             
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑗 is the natural logarithm of return of firm j at day i, 𝑅(𝑚)𝑖  is the 
market return, which the firm j is in, at day i. By using linear regression, we could 
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get 𝛽𝑗 and  𝜀𝑖𝑗. Thus, for all firms in the same industry, they will have the same 
variance of market return. And for certain firm, its systematic risk is composed of 
the industry risk and correlations between return of the firm and return of the 
market, so we use the natural logarithm of the sum of 𝛽𝑗
2 and variance,𝑅(𝑚)𝑖- 
to reflect firm’s systematic risk. For 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , it shows the deviation for firm j at day i 
from the model, thus we could treat it as the idiosyncratic risk and measure it by 
using the natural logarithm of the variance of 𝜀𝑖𝑗. We expected to get the similar 
results as former empirical studies, that is, positive correlations between 
systematic risk and firm value while negative correlations between idiosyncratic 
risk and firm value. 
 
(3) Size: we use the natural logarithm of total assets to measure firm size. We 
expected that Tobin’s Q is negatively correlated with firm size since smaller firms 
may have higher growth opportunities and more information transparencies 
which are preferred by investors, meanwhile, large companies may have 
conglomerate discounts. 
 
(4) Profitability: we use the return on total assets (ROA) to measure firm’s 
profitability. We expect that there exist positive correlations between Tobin’s Q 
and firm’s profitability since more profitable firms are less likely to meet with 
financial distresses, easier to finance for future growth opportunities, and more 
preferred by investors. 
 
(5) Sales growth: We use Growth = (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1)/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1  to measure 
firm’s growth from sales perspective. We expect that there exist positive 
correlations between Tobin’s Q and sales growth which is quite reasonable. 
 
(6) Investment growth: We use following ratios to measure firm’s growth from 
investment perspective: (a) capital expenditures (CAPEX)/sales; (b) R&D/sales; (c) 
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SG&A/sales. These ratios reflect firm’s future growth and more investments 
means the firm is trying to catch larger opportunities, thus it is reasonable to 
expect positive correlations between Tobin’s Q and these financial ratios. 
 
(7) Leverage: Debt has significant influences on EV from many aspects. For example, 
higher leverage means that firm has higher possibility to meet with financial 
distresses, higher leverage firms are usually with lower credit rating, are much 
costly to get access to capital market, and are discounted at higher rates during 
valuation. Lower leverage will also decrease equity risk which will increase firm 
value. Thus it is reasonable to expect negative correlation between EV and 
leverage. Brian, James and George (2008) used the ratio of long-term debt over 
total assets to measure firm’s leverage. However, we think that short-term debt 
will also have impacts on firm’s performance and firm value. Thus we use the 
following formula which is adjusted for short-term debt to measure leverage: 
 
Leverage =
100% ∙ Short − term Debt + 100% ∙ Long − term Debt
Total Assets
 
 
(8) Followed Brian, James and George (2008), we also control for time-effects 
by using year indicators. Since the purpose of this paper is to study cash-flow 
volatilities and firm value in different industries, thus we do not have to control 
for industry effects by using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) as Brian, 
James and George (2008) suggested. 
 
3.4. Cash flow volatility matters or accruals matters 
 
It is no doubt that earning management could reduce earnings volatility and create 
value for firm. This is usually achieved by accruals management and real cash flow 
management. As mentioned in the literature review, researchers think that earnings 
managements are mainly accruals managements and managers prefer to use 
accruals to reduce cash flow volatility to create value. In other words, cash flow after 
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accruals matters. However, this was challenged by Brian, James and George (2008). 
In their study, cash flow volatility has directly impact on firm value, but not through 
accruals, and they found that accruals do not create value, only real cash flow 
management matters. We examined the results and former theories carefully and 
found it was mentioned that whether accruals create value should be examined in 
specific industries but not basing on general level (or to say the whole market). 
However, Brian, James and George (2008)’s study was based on over 4,000 firms 
listed in U.S. from nearly every industry, thus we do think that it is necessary to check 
accruals’ influence on firm value again in specific industries. Basing on the former 
regression model, we add another two variables to the model: the natural logarithm 
of accrual volatility and correlation between cash flow volatility and accrual volatility. 
The relations between earnings volatility, cash flow volatility and accrual volatility is 
defined as the following formulas: 
{
Accrual𝑡 = Earnings𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡                                                    
𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
2 = 𝜎𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤
2 + 𝜎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2 + 2𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤, 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠)
 
And the new regression model is: 
Tobin′s Q = α + 𝛽
1
∙ ln(𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽
2
∙ ln(𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽
3
∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤, 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) + 𝛽
4
∙ ln(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)        + 𝛽
5
∙ ln(𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) + 𝛽
6
∙ ln(Total assets) + 𝛽
7
∙ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽
8
∙ 𝑔
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽
9
∙
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽
10
∙
𝑅&𝐷
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽
11
∙
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
       + 𝛽
12
∙ Leverage + 𝛽
13
∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜀 
 
 
By checking (1) the adjusted R2 of the model after introducing new variables and (2) 
the significance of those variables, we could judge if the new variables have 
explanation power on Tobin’s Q and if they improve the accuracy of the model. If the 
answers are yes, then we could check whether the coefficient is positive (means 
value creation) or negative (means value destruction). If not, then we know that the 
new variables do not have significant impact on firm value, thus not value creation. 
Model 2 – Multiple Regression Model controlling for accruals 
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3.5. Volatility creates value or destructs value 
 
We select samples that are only different in growth opportunities with other 
criteria similar. As mentioned in sample selection, we choose U.S. healthcare 
sector to achieve this goal. We believe that firms within biotech industry are with 
high growth opportunities while firms within pharmaceutical industry are with 
relatively lower growth opportunities. By checking whether cash flow volatility is 
positively or negatively related to Tobin’s Q, we could know if volatility is value 
creating or value destroying, and thus we could see how the results will support 
current theories and former researches. 
 
3.6. How cash-flow volatilities affect firm value 
 
Although quite a lot of researches have been done on studying the correlations 
between earnings volatility, cash-flow volatility and firm value, only a few are 
done to explain how cash-flow volatilities affect firm value, like through tax, 
financial distresses, information asymmetries etc. In our study, we combined 
items in income statements and items above net cash flows from operations in 
cash-flows statements to see factors that may have influence on CFO which were 
not mentioned in former researches and studies (See table 4). From table 4, we 
will build a new multiple-regression model to examine following items’ 
correlations with firm value: effect tax rate, interest expenses over sales.  
 
Tobin′s Q = α + 𝛽
1
∙ ln(𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑕 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽
2
∙ ln(𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)        + 𝛽
3
∙ ln(𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) + 𝛽
4
∙ ln(Total assets) + 𝛽
5
∙ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽
6
∙ 𝑔
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽
7
∙
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽
8
∙
𝑅&𝐷
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽
9
∙
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
       + 𝛽
10
∙ Leverage
+ 𝛽
11
∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽
12
∙ 𝜏 + 𝛽
13
∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀 
 Model 3 – New Multiple Regression Model with New Variables 
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Table 4 
In this table we will examine items that could have impacts on firm value. 
Items Note 
Revenue (Sales) Mentioned 
-COGS & SGA Mentioned 
-R&D Mentioned 
-Sales and Marketing (Advertising) Mentioned 
=Operating Income - 
  +other income / ( -other expense) Extraordinary item 
=EBIT - 
-interest expenses Not used 
=Income before income taxes - 
-income tax Not mentioned 
=Net income - 
+Depr. / Amor. Mentioned 
  +Stock-based compensation Mentioned 
  +Loss from investments and derivatives / (-Gain) Mentioned 
  -Excess tax benefits from stock-based compensation Mentioned 
  -Deferred income tax Not mentioned 
  +Net deferred revenue Not directly used 
+Changes in operating assets and liabilities Mentioned 
=Net cash flows from operations - 
 
 
(1) Tax rate (τ): We use yearly effect tax rate as measurement. We expected that tax 
rate is negatively related with firm value due to the reason that firms with 
smooth earnings and cash-flows will benefit more from the tax shield and pay 
less income tax. By introducing tax rate as a variable, deferred tax will also be 
measured which could have an influence on cash flow volatility. 
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(2) Interest expenses: Firms with similar leverage might bear different cost of debt 
while firms with similar interest expenses per year might have different earnings. 
Thus, for a firm with debt, not only principal matters, but also the interests. We 
think that only using leverage as variable is not enough to describe firm’s 
possibility to meet with financial distress. We add in the variable of interest 
expenses over sales to make the interest payments of different firms comparable 
and to describe firm’s financial distress better. We expect a negative correlation 
between this ratio and firm value. 
 
Besides the reasons mentioned above, we also seek for reasons lying in valuation 
process. Tax rate are important to calculate company’s tax shield while interests 
payment reflects company’s cost of debt. Thus we expected that the introducing 
of tax rate and interest expenses could improve our regression tests. Further 
details are discussed in section 4.2.3. 
 
3.7. Robostness 
 
We also designed robustness tests for our regression models to see if the results 
will be robust and reliable.  
 
(1) By using different measurements of our variables. For example, using 
standard deviation to measure volatilities, using only long-term debt to 
measure leverage, using natural logarithm of Capex, R&D and SG&A 
expenditures to exclude the influence of total sales.  
 
2 1 
B 
A 
Income 
Tax 
t 
A: Average income tax with volatile earnings 
B: Average income tax with smooth earnings 
Figure 1 – Income Tax and Earnings Volatility 
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(2) We strictly followed Brian, James and George (2008)’s sample selection and 
all data are extracted form DataStream (Data type: World Scope, annually, 
samples with no more than 2 missing data). We also adjusted abnormal 
numbers by checking the firm’s SEC filings. By using samples without any 
missing data for ten years, we will reduce our observations to 554. By exclude 
part of the data according to Brian, James and George (2008) and theoretical 
criteria (like lowest 5% total assets observations etc.), we will reduce our 
observations to 479. 
 
(3) By using different variables and checking the changing in model’s adjusted R2 
and changing in variables’ T-value, we could find which variables have 
significant explanation power and how they changed in different regression 
model, and thus get to the conclusion whether the coefficients results are 
robustness. 
 
(4) In order to make our regression tests reasonable, we avoid of using dummy 
variables in our original regression tests. However, in order to test the 
robustness of our results, we use dummy variables of time period to check if 
there is any change. We also use white (diagonal) method to eliminate 
heteroscedasticity problem. 
 
The robustness test results will be showed in section 4.4. 
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Part IV. Analysis 
 
4.1. Brief Introduction 
 
In this part, we are going to examine the regression results and to discuss these in 
details to reach reasonable explanations and conclusions. We will firstly go through 
the two U.S. industries, pharmaceutical and biotechnology, to see their own specific 
characteristics. And then we will put the results of the two industries together and 
compare them to see similarities and differences of the two industries. 
 
4.2. Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
4.2.1. Pearson Correlation Examination 
 
Followed Brian, James and George (2008), we firstly use Pearson correlation to 
examine whether there exist any multicollinearity problem of our variables used in 
the regression model. Based on the study from Kaplan (1994), the general method to 
detect multicollinearity is inspection of correlation matrix. We assume the 
correlation between each two variables in our correlation matrix should be less than 
0.5.10 We do think that it is even important for our study to do a more detailed 
Pearson correlation than Brian, James and George (2008). According to U.S. GAAP, 
firms that highly rely on R&D should capitalize their R&D expenditures which might 
cause multicollinearity problem between the two variable total assets (which is used 
to measure firm size) and R&D/Sales in our model. We are also interested in the 
correlations between leverage and annual interest expenses. Fortunately, no high 
multicollinearity is observed for former mentioned items. The correlation between 
total assets and R&D/Sales is -0.019, which could be explained by firm’s accounting 
choices. If firm choose to capitalize R&D expenditures, then it will increase its total 
                                                             
10
 A roughly but relatively conservative estimation according to several studies, such as Jensen (2003) 
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assets but reduce the numbers reported in consolidated statements of income, vice 
versa. This fact also found in studies related to capitalized R&D, such as research 
from Paul, Stewart and Christopher (2002). This also explained why these two items 
are not highly correlated, since the R&D expenditures should not be double reported 
in both consolidated balance sheets and consolidated income statements. For 
leverage and interest expenses, the correlation is 0.049, which is very easy to 
understand. Low leverage means low debt and thus low interest payments. While 
leverage could to some extent explain interest payments, the latter is also 
determined by cost of debt, which could not be reflected in leverage, thus no large 
correlation should be observed between the two items, and the result is in line with 
our estimation. However, we found high correlations between Capex/Sales, 
R&D/Sales, SG&A/Sales and Interest expenses/Sales. The reason is that these four 
items are measured by the percentage of companies’ revenues. After excluding the 
effect of sales, we no longer observe any high correlation in our model. We also 
observed a high correlation between EPS and CFPS which is quite easy to understand. 
Since we won’t use both variables at the same time, there won’t be any problem.The 
Pearson correlation table is in Appendix 1.1. 
 
4.2.2. Regression Test without New Variable 
 
Basing on former theories like Merton (1974) and empirical studies like Brian, James 
and George (2008), we do believe that cash flow volatility has influences on firm 
value, but not sure if the impact is positive or negative. In following part we present 
our regression test of following two hypotheses: 
 
(1) Cash flow volatility is negative related to firm value, which is measured as Tobin’s 
Q in our study. And if this is true, then our results will be in line with former 
empirical studies like Brian, James and George (2008), but still could not directly 
reject Merton Model. Or, 
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(2) Cash flow volatility is positive related to firm value. The values of firms in both 
industries highly rely on R&D successes, patents periods and the results are with 
high uncertainty, and thus higher volatility could lead to a higher Tobin’s Q. If this 
is true, then our results will support Merton Model, and more important, to 
prove that (i) volatility could be both value creation (as in our study) and value 
destruction (as Brian, James and George, 2008, etc.) and (ii) whether volatility is 
value creating or value destroying should be checked on an industry level. 
 
Table 4 shows that our believing in that cash flow volatility has an impact on firm 
value is correct. The logic behind it is that larger adjusted R2 reflect more 
accuracy of the model. In regression 1.1 we do not include systematic risks, 
idiosyncratic risks and volatilities, which are measurements of corporate 
uncertainty and growth opportunities, see Brian, James and George (2008), Shin 
and Stulz (2000). In this regression we could see a rather low accuracy with most 
items’ P-value larger than 10%. In regression 1.2 we add in systematic and 
idiosyncratic risks as variables but not cash flow volatility, and in regression 1.3 
we add in cash flow volatility. We could see great improvement after introducing 
cash flow volatility as variable since the adjusted R2 increased 0.079 from 
0.023357 to 0.102659. Meanwhile, we could see that now most variables have 
better explanation powers with P-values under 0.1. This illustrates that cash-flow 
volatility do impact firm value. 
 
Similar to former studies and arguments, we found negative coefficients between 
cash flow volatility and Tobin’s Q. The result demonstrates that, for U.S. 
Pharmaceutical firms, volatile cash flows will destroy value, or at least destroy 
more than it could create. This is in line with Brian, James and George (2008) and 
supports our hypothesis (1). It also meets with our estimation that cash flow 
volatility will generally destruct value for mature industry with lower growth 
opportunities.  
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Table 4 
In this table we will present results from panel regressions of our 569 observations. P-values 
are reported beneath the coefficients results in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Tobin’s Q) 
 Regression 1.1 Regression 1.2 Regression 1.3 
Ln (Cash flow volatility)   -0.08879 
   (0.0049) 
Ln (Systematic risk)  -0.045638 0.003733 
  (0.399) (0.8813) 
Ln (Idiosyncratic risk)  0.39138 0.286527 
  (0.0015) (0.0000) 
Ln (Total assets) 0.066918 0.251304 0.066137 
 (0.0601) (0.0003) (0.0380) 
Sales growth -9.24E-05 -6.49E-05 0.000102 
 (0.6458) (0.7468) (0.2643) 
Return on assets -0.003826 -0.003601 -0.002822 
 (0.1143) (0.1397) (0.013) 
Capex/Sales -0.034184 -0.053698- -0.058835 
 (0.5414) (0.3462) (0.0237) 
R&D/Sales -0.001466 0.003331 -0.004224 
 (0.7736) (0.5204) (0.0737) 
SG&A/Sales 0.001996 0.003657 0.003983 
 (0.6433) (0.4051) (0.0467) 
Leverage 9.52E-05 8.94E-05 3.44E-05 
 (0.101) (0.123) (0.1919) 
Constant -3.780265 -3.398679 0.131773 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.5842) 
    
    
Adj. R2 0.009697 0.023357 0.102659 
 
Table 5 
In this table, we check variables with significant coefficients with Tobin’s Q in regression 1.3. 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Tobin’s Q) 
Variables Coefficients Significant Level P-Value 
Ln (Cash flow volatility) -0.08879 *** (0.0049) 
Ln (Idiosyncratic risk) 0.286527 *** (0.0000) 
Ln (Total assets) 0.066137 ** (0.0380) 
Return on assets -0.002822 ** (0.013) 
Capex/Sales -0.058835 ** (0.0237) 
R&D/Sales -0.004224 * (0.0737) 
SG&A/Sales 0.003983 ** (0.0467) 
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However, for other variables except SG&A costs, the results are opposite to Brian, 
James and George (2008). The reason could be that our work focus on specific 
industries but not all listed U.S. firms, thus our results stand for specific industry 
characteristics of U.S. pharmaceutical firms. Meanwhile, Brian, James and George 
(2008) and our study use different time periods (and the reasons are explained in 
Methodology part). Thus the different results could also possibly reflect recent 
changes. Possible explanations are: 
 
(1) Systematic and Idiosyncratic risks: Brian, James and George (2008) used Shin 
and Stulz (2000)’s method to measure these two kinds of risks and found that 
systematic risk is positive related to Tobin’s Q while idiosyncratic risk is 
negative related to Tobin’s Q. However, in Shin and Stulz(2000), the authors 
mentioned that this method and following results only fit for large companies 
in specific circumstances. For our sample of pharmaceutical companies in 
2010, we have an average total asset of $8.15 billion. However, only 7 firms’ 
total assets is above average, while the median of total asset is only $0.12 
billion, this is not difficult to understand since U.S. pharmaceutical market are 
mainly dominated by several global giants as Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson, 
while other companies are all small and medium size and focusing on either a 
few specific patent medicines or some other Nicky markets. The other reason 
is time period. Both Brian, James and George (2008) and Shin and Stulz (2000) 
focus on time periods of late 20th century while our study choose a time 
period from year 2001 to 2010, which could mean that the industry 
environment might have already changed. From this point of view, we think 
that Shin and Stulz(2000)’s results do not meet with our samples. Rogers, 
Maranas and Ding (2005) argued that pharmaceutical companies usually 
enter into partnerships with biotechnology firms in order to get licensed 
developed medicines and thus two companies will share their risks or more 
exactly, risk shifting from biotechnology firms to pharmaceutical companies. 
These kinds of risks are generally like marketing and manufacturing, but not 
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the possibility of failure to develop the medicine or failure to pass the FDA’s 
regulation since the medicine is already developed and licensed. Thus a 
pharmaceutical company with a higher idiosyncratic risk signals that the firm 
is currently involving into more corporate joint ventures or strategic alliances, 
which enable the firm to access to more licensed patents and larger revenues. 
From this point of view, idiosyncratic risk could be positive related to Tobin’s 
Q within pharmaceutical industry. 
 
(2) Total assets: It is observed in Brian, James and George (2008) that the firm 
size is negative correlated with firm value, but no explanation is given. Till 
now, however, few empirical studies are specifically designed to find the 
reasons behind this phenomenon and no theory could perfectly explain it. 
Our study finds that Tobin’s Q is positive related to total asset, which is a 
proxy of firm size. The possible explanation is that larger firms could bear 
more risks, which is appreciated by investors and thus lead to a higher 
market-to-book value. From corporate governance and valuation theory 
points of view, larger firm may have more interest conflicts and information 
asymmetries, and its structure is more difficult for outsider to understand, 
which means lower transparency to outside. And low transparency firms are 
usually related to high market-to-book value which shows that the market is 
difficult to correctly value the firm and thus deviate more from its book value. 
 
(3) Capital expenditures: Theoretically, all firms within mature industry will tend 
to generate similar return on invested capital (ROIC) which would not deviate 
far from industry weight average cost of capital (WACC), and new investments 
usually won’t create a large value for the firm11. And firms within mature 
industry tend to seek for potential cost reduction rather than highly relying on 
new investments (Schon, 2008). For pharmaceutical industry, which is highly 
                                                             
11
 See Palepv et al, 2007, “Business Anaylsis and Valuation Tools”, Chapter 6 
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mature, higher capital expenditures could means that the firm could not 
effectively reduce its cost, mainly manufacturing cost. Thus higher Capex will 
be related with lower Tobin’s Q. 
 
(4) R&D expenditures: Following Rogers, Maranas and Ding (2005) and our argue 
of idiosyncratic risk, it is reasonable to believe that high R&D expenditures for 
pharmaceutical companies is a bad signaling to market that the firm is lacking 
of licensed patents resources or most of the firm’s on-going patents will be 
out of date soon or, even worse, that the company is facing with both 
problems at the same time. Due to the long period of developing new 
medicines (generally 10 to 20 years, from launching the research plan to 
finishing human testing, not including waiting for the FDA’s approve), the 
possibility of failure of medicine test and unexpected termination, and the 
failure to get FDA’s approve, increasing in R&D expenditure largely increases 
the firm’s risk and reduces its flexibility. Thus R&D expenditures will be 
negatively related with Tobin’s Q. 
 
(5) SG&A expenditures: We also observe a positive coefficients between SG&A 
and Tobin’s Q. This is similar to Brian, James and George (2008) that selling 
and marketing are positive related with firm value. However, in Brian, James 
and George (2008)’s study, they did not include general and administration 
expenditures, thus it is necessary for us to explain these two kinds of fees’ 
relation with firm value. The general and administration expenditures could 
be another proxy of firm size and larger firms tend to have higher general and 
administration expenses under the condition that the firms’ corporate 
governance systems are effective and efficient. Following our argue of firm 
size’s relation with Tobin’s Q, it is reasonable to believe that firms with higher 
general and administration fees will tend to have a higher Tobin’s Q. 
 
Both Brian, James and George (2008) and our study find that leverage does not 
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significant related to Tobin’s Q. In our study, systematic risk and sales are also not 
significant. Pharmaceutical industry itself is a quite mature industry. U.S. FDA is 
famous for its strict regulation and cautious attitude towards new products, without 
frequent changes of regulation policies. These factors largely reduced the systematic 
volatility, and thus could be used to explain why systematic risk is not significant for 
pharmaceutical companies. From theoretical point of view, firms within mature 
industries are usually hard to achieve large sales growth without specific tactics like 
mergers and acquisitions. Thus sales growth won’t have a significant impact on 
Tobin’s Q. 
 
Interestingly, we also observe a negative coefficient between Tobin’s Q and return on 
assets (ROA). This is mainly due to that most of the pharmaceutical firms reported 
net losses in recent years. In our sample of pharmaceutical industry, over 50% 
observations have a positive Ln (Tobin’s Q) while a negative ROA. Thus now it is clear 
why our regression results showed a negative coefficient between these two items. 
This doesn’t mean that firm with lower ROA will have higher market value, it just 
reflects the phenomenon that lots of firms with Tobin’s Q above 1 reported net 
losses. 
 
4.2.3. Regression Test with Interest Expenses and Tax Rate as Variables 
 
In this part, we introduce another two variables to try to improve the model one step 
more and try to use these variables to check whether cash flow, without relying on 
other factors, has direct impact on firm value. The choosing of variables is based on 
the items below Total Sales or Revenue and above Cash Flows from Operating as 
Table 1 in Methodology part. Although seeing from the regression results that these 
two variables are not significant, it is still important for us to argue the meaning to do 
this test. 
 
One may argue that, Free cash flow (FCF) =Cash flow from operations (CFO) + 
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Depreciation – Reinvestments in depreciation – New investments in working capital – 
New investments, and once CFO is decided, FCF is decided (since depreciation, 
reinvestments and new investments are controlled by the variable Capex/Sales), and 
for a discount-cash-flow valuation (DCF Valuation), the firm value is decided by the 
FCF and given discounting rate. And thus it is meaningless to add other variables like  
 
Table 6 
In this table, we added another two variables, namely annual interest expenses and tax 
rate, to see if there is any improvement of the regression model. 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Tobin’s Q) 
Variables Regression 1.3 Regression 1.4 Regression 1.5 
Effective Tax Rate   0.003272 
   (0.9632) 
Interest Expenses/Sales  -0.00112  
  (0.7771)  
Ln (Cash flow volatility) -0.08879 -0.088411 -0.088682 
 (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0051) 
Ln (Systematic risk) 0.003733 0.003251 0.003754 
 (0.8813) (0.8969) (0.8808) 
Ln (Idiosyncratic risk) 0.286527 0.28831 0.286575 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Ln (Total assets) 0.066137 0.067182 0.06611 
 (0.0380) (0.0365) (0.0383) 
Sales growth 0.000102 0.000102 0.000102 
 (0.2643) (0.2653) (0.2647) 
Return on assets -0.002822 -0.002769 -0.002822 
 (0.013) (0.0162) (0.0131) 
Capex/Sales -0.058835 -0.066212 -0.058825 
 (0.0237) (0.0723) (0.0238) 
R&D/Sales -0.004224 -0.004822 -0.004223 
 (0.0737) (0.1284) (0.0741) 
SG&A/Sales 0.003983 0.004598 0.003983 
 (0.0467) (0.1199) (0.047) 
Leverage 3.44E-05 3.47E-05 3.44E-05 
 (0.1919) (0.189) (0.1922) 
Constant 0.131773 0.131436 0.132302 
 (0.5842) (0.5854) (0.5834) 
    
    
Adj. R2 0.102659 0.101178 0.101052 
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tax rate or interest payments since they are all items above net income in income 
statements and net income is above CFO in cash-flow statements. However, we have 
our reasons to prove that it is necessary to do such tests, although the results show 
that it indeed is not significant. 
 
We could look at the formula to calculate discounting rate, or WACC. If we do not 
take inflation rate into account, WACC = Rd * (1 – tax rate) * D/ (D+E) +Re * E/ (D+E).
12 
For Brian, James and George (2008), they take leverage into consideration. And since 
the purpose for Brian, James and George (2008) is to see if investors value the 
smooth performance, it is the equity investors themselves bearing the cost of equity. 
So we do not take cost of equity into consideration. We take the other two factors 
into consideration. For cost of debt, we use annual interest payments as a proxy 
since no weight cost of debt could be found for our samples in the database and it is 
too complicated and difficult for us to hand collect company’s all debt contracts and 
calculate weight cost of debt and its duration as mentioned in Koller et al (2010). 
 
However, the results are not satisfied. We could see that the P-values for both 
variables are quite high and the adjusted R2 generally decreases after using either of 
the new variables. So in our study it is hard to say whether cash flow volatility has a 
direct impact on firm value or through the effect of tax and potential financial 
distress. But this could not reject our assumption that tax rate and cost of debt 
matter since our samples are not perfect. From the data we collected, a lot of 
pharmaceutical firms bear net losses in recent years, which means that the effective 
tax rate could not be observed. And most of the pharmaceutical companies are quite 
                                                             
12
 See Koller et al, “Valuation”, Fifth edition, P261-265. If take inflation rate into consideration, see 
Arzac, “Valueation for Mergers, Buyouts, and Restructuring”, Second edition. But inflation won’t 
affect our introduction of tax rate and interest payments as variables. By taking inflation into 
consideration, one just need to add inflation into the WACC calculation, but would not remove tax 
rate or cost of debt. Higher inflation will reduce the true value of firm due to increasing in WACC. For 
the purpose to make it easy to describe, calculate and understand what affects Tobin’s Q, we won’t 
take inflation into consideration here. 
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cash rich with low leverage, it is not so easy to capture the effect of financial distress 
caused by cost of debt. Thus we suggest a further more study on industries like oil 
and gas or automobiles to see if tax rate and interests payments really matter. 
 
4.2.4. The Effect of Accruals 
 
There is a potential logic problem lying behind how people consider cash flow 
volatility. Traditionally, the theoretical framework considers that earnings 
management are mainly accruals management, and it treats cash flow volatility in a 
“vertical” way since cash flow itself is a product of total revenue minus accruals, and 
the logic of cash flow volatility in this framework is that cash flow volatility is created 
by earnings volatility after the elimination of accruals, it is totally new and could not 
exists alone without both earnings volatility and accruals. Thus accruals management 
creates value. However, this is challenged by Brian, James and George (2008), in their 
study they found that accruals volatility seldom affect Tobin’s Q. Thereby, they 
refused the conclusion that accrual matters. However, if “accruals are value creation” 
is not true, why they are still widely used by today’s corporations? If cash flow 
volatility is not a product of earnings and accruals, then what it should be? 
 
The traditional theoretical framework is limited by how cash flow is calculated in 
accounting theory. From our point of view, cash flow volatility should already be 
contained in earnings volatility. The logic should be that earnings volatility is a 
product of both cash flow volatility and accruals volatility. And earnings management 
should not be treated as mainly accrual managements. Corporate behaviours like 
hedging and using financial derivatives should be redefined as real cash flow 
management. Thus, the cash flow volatility does not only exist in item Cash Flow 
from Operation, it already exists in Total Sales or Revenues. Accruals management 
might be used to dressing financial statements or taking big baths due to managers’ 
self-interests, it could also be for tax considerations. However, delaying current year’s 
tax liability by accruals could not really create value since the company has to pay 
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more tax in later years. However, following agency theory, the increasing of net 
income (by reducing current year’s tax payments) could increase the reputation of 
the manager who is in charge at present and they do not need to consider what will 
happen in later years when they will not work for the firm. And this could also 
increase manager’s bonus if it is linked with firm’s performance.  
 
However, there are still other arguements like that the effect of accruals should be 
examined on an industry level since accruals’ influence on firm value differs from 
industry to industry. To make sure whether Brian, James and George (2008)’s results 
are correct, we design the following regression tests to check it (see Table 5). 
 
Focusing on the changing of adjusted R2, we could see that by using of accruals and 
cash flow volatilities instead of using earning volatility slightly improve the accuracy 
of the model. Meanwhile, since in our model earnings volatility consists and only 
consists of accruals volatility and cash flow volatility, it is easy to understand why the 
improvement is not so large, since they measured the same thing. We could see that 
accruals volatility has very little influence on Tobin’s Q since the P-value is over 85%, 
which reflects a large scale of “random walk”. Meanwhile, cash flow volatility is 
negatively related with Tobin’s Q. These results reflects that investors (1) prefer lower 
cash flow volatility; (2) do not treat accruals volatility as value creation; (3) Even if 
the accruals volatility’s P-value is under 10%, it still means that investors prefer lower 
accrual volatility which means that less earning smooth by accruals will lead to 
higher value. The results remain unchanged even if we take the correlation of cash 
flow volatility and accrual volatility into consideration to reduce multicollinearity 
problem in our robustness test.  
 
We also observe a relatively large improvement by only using cash flow volatility as 
variables (from 0.090 to 0.102), when compared with the improvement by using 
both accruals and cash flow volatilities (from 0.090 to 0.093), which indicates that 
cash flow volatility is the primitive and primary volatility factor that determine firm’s 
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Tobin’s Q, and this result is also consist with Brian, James and George (2008).  
 
Table 7 
In this table, we show three regressions with different volatility variables, for regression 2.1, 
we use earnings volatility as variables. For regression 2.2, instead of using earnings volatility, 
we use the method mentioned in methodology part to decouple earnings volatility into cash 
flow volatility and accruals volatility and use these two factors as variables. For regression 
2.3, we remove the accruals volatility and only keep cash flow volatility as variable. Thus, 
through compare this three regression tests, we could get access to the answer to whether 
accruals create value in U.S. pharmaceutical industry. 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Tobin’s Q) 
 Regression 2.1 Regression 2.2 Regression 2.3 
Ln (Earnings volatility) -0.073804   
 (0.0321)   
Ln (Accruals volatility)  -0.007566  
  (0.8459)  
Ln (Cash flow volatility)  -0.08556 -0.08879 
  (0.041) (0.0049) 
Ln (Systematic risk) 0.003778 0.000519 0.003733 
 (0.8848) (0.9837) (0.8813) 
Ln (Idiosyncratic risk) 0.280771 0.260639 0.286527 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Ln (Total assets) 0.075557 0.064182 0.066137 
 (0.0218) (0.0474) (0.0380) 
Sales growth 0.000101 0.000104 0.000102 
 (0.2766) (0.2513) (0.2643) 
Return on assets -0.002741 -0.00303 -0.002822 
 (0.0211) (0.0081) (0.013) 
Capex/Sales -0.05611 -0.059398 -0.058835 
 (0.0339) (0.0215) (0.0237) 
R&D/Sales -0.003997 -0.004275 -0.004224 
 (0.0964) (0.0685) (0.0737) 
SG&A/Sales 0.003808 0.004018 0.003983 
 (0.0619) (0.0435) (0.0467) 
Leverage 3.99E-05 3.58E-05 3.44E-05 
 (0.1364) (0.1723) (0.1919) 
Constant -0.002228 -0.034213 0.131773 
 (0.9929) (0.8898) (0.5842) 
    
    
Adj. R2 0.089757 0.092889 0.102659 
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When taking all results above into consideration, even they do not necessarily mean 
that accruals management will destruct value, we are able to say that the results 
indicate that, for U.S. pharmaceutical industry, earning management could only 
create value through real cash flow management while accruals management seldom 
add value. Our results are in line with Brian, James and George (2008). 
 
4.3. Biotechnology Industry 
 
4.3.1. Pearson Correlation Examination and Regression Tests Results 
 
Generally, we do same Pearson correlation test and regression tests for U.S. 
biotechnology industry as we did for U.S. pharmaceutical industry. No correlation is 
observed higher than 0.5, which indicates that there doesn’t exist any serious 
multicollinearity problem. The Pearson correlation test could be found in Appendix 
1.2. 
 
Table 8 
In this table we present results from panel regressions of 505 observations in biotechnology 
industry. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Tobin’s Q) 
Variables Coefficient Significance level P-value 
Ln (Cash flow volatility) 0.009694 (*) (0.1072) 
Ln (Systematic risk) -0.025262  (0.2881) 
Ln (Idiosyncratic risk) 0.059405  (0.2496) 
Ln (Total assets) -0.417163 *** (0.0000) 
Sales growth 8.77E-05  (0.8914) 
Return on assets -0.243377 *** (0.0038) 
Capex/Sales 0.001196 ** (0.0265) 
R&D/Sales 0.001468 *** (0.0000) 
SG&A/Sales -0.001256 *** (0.0000) 
Leverage 4.76E-06  (0.2408) 
Constant 4.334323 *** (0.0000) 
    
    
Adj. R2 0.685135   
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Similar as pharmaceutical industry, we observed an increase in adjusted R2 after 
introducing systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk as variables. We also observed a 
great increase in adjusted R2 after introducing cash flow volatility, which means that 
cash flow volatility is one important determinant of Tobin’s Q. Tax rate and annual 
interest payments are still not statistically significant. 
 
The panel regression results above show the significance of the controls we tested. 
According to our result, the firm size, which is measured by Ln (total assets), is the 
most significant one (T-value is -5.378) with a strong negatively coefficient relation 
with Tobin’s q. It shows that in biotechnology industry, the firms with lower total 
assets have higher Tobin’s Q, which is measured by market-to-book values. This could 
be explained that generally there are more growth opportunities for small firms 
when compared with large companies, and investors will value this. The R&D/Sales 
and SG&A/Sales also have strong statistical significance. The result indicates the 
R&D/Sales have slightly positively coefficients with Tobin’s Q and the SG&A/Sales 
have a slightly negatively coefficient. It could explain by that the firms with higher 
R&D expenses tend to have higher market value since these means that companies 
are trying to catch with potential growth opportunities, and these are essential for 
the value creation in biotech industry.  The empirical evidence from Brian, James 
and George (2008) also support the positively coefficient of capital expenditure and 
R&D expenses. Our results also shows the firms with less SG&A expense have higher 
market value since less SG&A expense could provide firms with more flexibility to 
catch growth opportunity by offering more general resources from inside (Tong and 
Reuer, 2006). The return on assets also have a significant negatively coefficient as for 
pharmaceutical industry. This raised a question: Should not a higher ROA represent a 
higher firm value? We check our data and found that in our samples of 
biotechnology industry, most of the firms reported losses in recent 10 years, which 
caused a negatively return on assets. Although we use natural logarithm to control 
Tobin’s Q, there are still over 70% of the samples have opposite sign between ROA 
and Tobin’s q, or to say, positive Tobin’s Q with negative ROA. This will of course 
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generate a negative coefficient between Tobin’s Q and ROA. Thus, we do think that 
this phenomenon indicates that many firms with market-to-book ratio higher than 
113 reported loss rather than firms with lower ROAs are more appreciated by 
investors. 
 
The Capex/Sales is significant at 5% level with a positively coefficient. A possible 
explanation is that more capital expenditure could be a positive sign to investors that 
the firm is currently investing more which indicates the existence of growth options.  
Although the cash flow volatility isn’t so statistically significant, it is still close to the 
10% level and relatively more “significant” than other controls. If we consider this 
result is a statistically meaningful result, the positively coefficient conflicts with the 
result from Rountree, Weston and Allayannis (2008). The conflicts could cause either 
by insignificant result or the view of real option, which demonstrates that the firms 
with higher cash flow volatility has more valuable growth opportunity if the growth 
opportunities are real option on cash flow from assets in place (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1993). And this will support our hypothesis (2) mentioned in analysis of 
pharmaceutical industry that volatility could be value creation and thus support for 
Merton(1974). 
 
4.3.2. The effect of accruals 
 
We also make a similar comparison as we do for pharmaceutical industry by setting 
up three different regression models with different controls. In overall, the significant 
level for the intercommunity controls change little, as well as the coefficient. 
However, the increasing adjusted R-square from regression 5.1, 5.2 and regression 
5.3 indicate the cash flow volatility add some explanatory power of regression model. 
The adjusted R-square increased by 0.0007 from regression 5.1 to 5.2, and 0.0006 
from regression 5.2 to 5.3. Although the change is minor, there is clearly an 
                                                             
13
 Since we use Ln(M/B) as an approximation of Ln(Tobin’s Q), a M/B above 1 will lead to a positive 
Ln(Tobin’s Q) 
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increasing trend when we emphasize the cash flow volatility.  
 
Table 9 
In this table, we show three regressions with different volatility variables, for regression 5.1, 
we use earnings volatility as variables. For regression 5.2, instead of using earnings volatility, 
we use the method mentioned in methodology part to decouple earnings volatility into cash 
flow volatility and accruals volatility and use these two factors as variables. For regression 
5.3, we remove the accruals volatility and only keep cash flow volatility as variable. Thus, 
through compare this three regression tests, we could get access to the answer to whether 
accruals create value in U.S. biotechnology industry. 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Tobin’s Q) 
 Regression 5.1 Regression 5.2 Regression 5.3 
Ln (Earnings volatility) -0.002281   
 (0.6597)   
Ln (Accruals volatility)  0.009267  
  (0.6383)  
Ln (Cash flow volatility)  0.009713 0.009694 
  (0.1046) (0.1072) 
Ln (Systematic risk) -0.029071 -0.026399 -0.025262 
 (0.2267) (0.2677) (0.2881) 
Ln (Idiosyncratic risk) 0.059681 0.057652 0.059405 
 (0.2520) (0.2606) (0.2496) 
Ln (Total assets) -0.413726 -0.41894 -0.417163 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Sales growth 0.00015 0.000194 8.77E-05 
 (0.8182) (0.7786) (0.8914) 
Return on assets -0.246344 -0.239656 -0.243377 
 (0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0038) 
Capex/Sales 0.001191 0.001147 0.001196 
 (0.0272) (0.0403) (0.0265) 
R&D/Sales 0.001447 0.001432 0.001468 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
SG&A/Sales -0.001247 -0.001226 -0.001256 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Leverage 4.76E-06 4.83E-06 4.76E-06 
 (0.2430) (0.2369) (0.2408) 
Constant 4.286168 4.344267 4.334323 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
    
Adj. R2 0.683816 0.684516 0.685135 
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One reason is the statistic significant of cash flow volatility is close to 10% level, 
contrast to the insignificant of earning volatility and accruals. Another possible 
reason is our result is consistent with the conclusion of Brian, James and George 
(2008), which indicate the earning smooth via accruals doesn’t add value beyond the 
cash-flow component of earnings. The comparison between regression 3 and 
regression 2 reveals slightly changes when add accruals. It could not clearly explain 
since the accruals do not have statistical significance. As a result, the conclusion from 
Brian, James and George (2008) could not be supported by our result, but only 
provide a possible explanation. 
 
4.4. Robustness 
 
We use the method described in methodology part to test the robustness of our 
regression results. The results are satisfied and show that our regression tests are 
reliable: 
 
(1) By using different measurements of our variables: The results keep 
unchanged with our former regression tests, which indicate that our 
measurements of variables are reliable. 
 
(2) By adjusting/excluding abnormal data: The results remain unchanged. These 
indicate that our selected samples and observations are reliable. 
 
(3) By using different variables and checking the changing in model’s adjusted R2 
and changing in variables’ T-value, we found that idiosyncratic risk has the 
most powerful determination on Tobin’s Q, the T-value never falls below 3. 
Cash flow volatility, Total assets remain T-values above 2. Other significant 
variables have T-values around 2 with slightly deviation. This indicates that 
the significances of our variables are reliable. 
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(4) In order to test the robustness of our results, we use dummy variables of time 
period to check if there is any change. We also use white (diagonal) method 
to eliminate heteroscedasticity problem. The results are consisting with our 
original regression tests. This indicates that the results of our variables are 
reliable. 
 
4.5. Comparisons Between U.S. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries 
 
In this part, we will compare our regression results for both industries and try to give 
out reasonable explanations to our four questions raised at the very beginning. 
 
We do observe different coefficients between cash flow volatility and firm value in 
these two different industries. However, it is hard to say whether cash flow volatility 
impacts more on non-asset-intensive industry as we estimated. There are two 
alternative explanations:  
 
(1) If we accept that the cash flow volatility has a significant impact on Tobin’s Q: 
Although the absolute value shows that there is a higher coefficient in 
biotechnology industry which stands for high growth industry, the cash flow 
volatilities’ influences are totally different for two industries. In our study, we see 
value destruction from cash flow volatility in pharmaceutical industry, which 
consists with the result of Brian, James and George (2008), while on the contrary 
value creation from cash flow volatility in biotechnology industry. Thus these two 
kinds of influence could not be compared directly and a quantitatively 
comparison will be meaningless. What we could say is that cash flow volatility 
does have different impacts on firms in different industries. We prefer to believe 
that the differences are caused by growth option since the results could be 
perfectly support by current existing academic theories and empirical studies on 
both sides. However, this also need further research to examine cash flow 
volatilities’ influences on all industries. Or 
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Table 10 
In this table, we will compare main variables and their coefficients and significant level. 
P-values are reported beneath the coefficients results in parentheses. 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Tobin’s Q) 
Panel A Pharmaceutical Biotechnology 
Ln (Cash flow volatility) -0.08879 0.009694 
 (0.0049)*** (0.1072)(*) 
Ln (Systematic risk) 0.003733 -0.025262 
 (0.8813) (0.2881) 
Ln (Idiosyncratic risk) 0.286527 0.059405 
 (0.0000)*** (0.2496) 
Ln (Total assets) 0.066137 -0.417163 
 (0.0380)** (0.0000)*** 
Sales growth 0.000102 8.77E-05 
 (0.2643) (0.8914) 
Return on assets -0.002822 -0.243377 
 (0.013)** (0.0038)*** 
Capex/Sales -0.058835 0.001196 
 (0.0237)** (0.0265)** 
R&D/Sales -0.004224 0.001468 
 (0.0737)* (0.0000)*** 
SG&A/Sales 0.003983 -0.001256 
 (0.0467)** (0.0000)*** 
Leverage 3.44E-05 4.76E-06 
 (0.1919) (0.2408) 
Constant 0.131773 4.334323 
 (0.5842) (0.0000)*** 
   
Panel B Pharmaceutical Biotechnology 
Ln (Accruals volatility) Not significant Not significant 
Interest Expenses/Sales Not significant Not significant 
Effective Tax Rate Not significant Not significant 
 
(2) If we reject that the cash flow volatility has a significant impact on Tobin’s Q: 
Thus cash flow volatility will have a significant impact on mature industry while 
won’t have a significant impact on industries with high growth option. Possible 
explanation is that investors who involved into a high growth industry are not 
risk-averse and have already accepted the potential risks due to the growth 
option or otherwise they will just invest in low risk industries that generate stable 
but generally low returns. Thus investors of high growth industries no longer take 
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cash flow volatility into consideration. In this way, cash flow volatility does have 
different impacts on industries with different level of potential growth, but the 
impact could also not be compared directly and quantitatively. However, there 
exist potential challenges from both behavior finance theory and corporate 
finance theory. From behavioral theory point of view, people are generally 
risk-averse, and thus should prefer a stable cash flow (Hersh Shefrin, “Behavioral 
corporate finance”, P11-12). While from corporate finance point of view, 
investors could do diversifications by themselves by making up their own 
portfolios to diversify risk. Thus no matter which industry the investor is involved 
in, he/she should always not be risk-averse as long as owning a diversified 
investment portfolio (Gaughan, “Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate 
Restructuring”, p136-145). Then it is hard to say why investors do value smooth 
cash flow in a mature industry, as in our study, pharmaceutical industry. 
In both situations we do observe different impacts of cash flow volatility on firm 
value and the results could give us reasonable explanations to our Question 1. 
Although it is hard to compare the influences directly and quantitatively, we 
believe that the different is caused by growth options, and what’s more, volatility 
could be both value creating and value destroying. This will lead to the discussion 
of our Question 3. 
 
The results of our study, basing on an industry level, support former studies from 
both sides. The result of value destruction in pharmaceutical industry is in line with 
Trueman and Titman (1988), Badrinath, Gay, and Kale (1989), J.Peter Ferderer (1993), 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), John and Clifford (1999) and Brian, James and 
George (2008), while the result of value creation consists with Merton (1974) and 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003). This exactly meets with our assumption that cash flow 
volatility could be both value creations (as it represents future potential growth 
opportunities) and value destructions (as it will cause problems related to financing, 
cost of capital, tax and financial distress) at the same time, and the net effect should 
be examined on an industry basis. The conflicts could shows that in certain 
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circumstances one theory will have more explanation power than others. What’s 
more, it also reflects that sometimes different theories are not the two polar of one 
line, and it will give us a totally new view if we use an eclectic point of view but not 
the conflict one.  
 
When it comes to Question 2, results from both industries show that accruals 
managements seldom add value to firm and are not valued by investors. The results 
are in line with Brian, James and George (2008). This indicates that (1) earning 
management could create value, but only to the extent how much cash flow volatility 
is reduced; (2) management should focus on real cash flow management but not 
accruals management to create value; (3) traditional theoretical framework has its 
logic problem as discussed in section 2.4. 
 
The results of introducing tax rate and annual interest payments are not satisfied 
since both variables are not significant in both industries’ regression tests. We didn’t 
see any improvement in model’s adjusted R2. However, this could also indicate that 
cash flow volatility has a direct impact on firm value but not through other factors 
since we have already take all factors that are used in a DCF valuation into 
consideration and it is common accepted that a DCF valuation should be the most 
accurate valuation method. However, we still suggest a further research focusing on 
industries with more positive ROA to check whether cash flow has direct impacts on 
firm value is true. 
 
Till now, our regression test results have already answered all four questions. 
However, there are still some interesting phenomenons that worth further study. For 
example, we could see that (1) firm size is positively related to Tobin’s Q while most 
of former empirical studies come to the conclusion of negative coefficients and (2) 
capital expenditures and R&D expenses are negatively related to Tobin’s Q which is 
also not in line with most of former studies. We followed former studies’ 
methodology to select samples and to set variables, and we have also done a series 
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of robustness test to prove that our results are reliable, but we still get some results 
that go against with existing researches, like Brian, James and George (2008), the one 
we strictly followed. This indicates that some of the results are on a general basis 
while the real situation may deviate from those results, just like in our study, the cash 
flow volatility’s impacts on firm value. 
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Part V. Conclusion 
5.1. Conclusion 
 
This paper, basing on U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries which 
represent mature industry and high growth option industry separately, tests four 
hypotheses related to cash flow volatility’s impacts on firm values: 
 
(1) Cash flow volatilities’ impacts on firms differ from pharmaceutical industry to 
biotechnology industry although the two industries are highly related and to 
some extent similar to each other. 
(2) Cash flow volatilities will be net value creating for biotechnology firms while net 
value destroying for pharmaceutical firms. This will demonstrates that cash flow 
volatility could be both value creating and value destroying. 
(3) The result from Brian, James and George (2008) that accruals generally do not 
add value is also true when be examined on an industry basis but not on a 
national basis. 
(4) Effective tax rate and annual interest payments will not affect cash flow 
volatilities’ influence on firm values in our study. 
 
While former studies like Brian, James and George (2008) has done similar works on 
a national basis contain samples from all industries, still little work is done on an 
industry level to see if there is any difference between industry specification and 
general situation. 
 
Our study finds that cash flow volatilities’ impacts differ from one industry to the 
other. For pharmaceutical industry, cash flow volatilities are generally value 
destroying, which is in line with former studies and indicates that although the 
results could not specifically deny the positive effects of cash flow volatility, the value 
destruction from a volatile cash flow outweigh potential gains from it. However, for 
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biotechnology industry, we do observe positive coefficients between cash flow 
volatilities and firms’ Tobin’s Qs. The comparisons of two industries indicate that the 
hypothesis that cash flow volatility could be both value creation and value 
destruction is right. Our results support theories and researches for sides like Merton 
(1974) and Brian, James and George (2008). Moreover, our results support an 
eclectic approach to different theories and show that different results are sometimes 
not the two opposite polar of one line, but one outweigh the others in certain 
circumstances. Other signals like the effects of firm size, capital expenditures and 
R&D expenditures on firm values also differ from the general situation in 
pharmaceutical industry. Through digging deeply into the reasons behind these 
phenomenons, we found that they could all be explained by different growth 
opportunities for different industries. Although our results are robust within U.S. 
healthcare sector and we expect that similar situations could be observed for other 
industries that differ in growth options, we still suggest more researches to be done 
on an industries basis in order to identify different industry specifications, which 
could make the theoretical results more applicable for real business running. 
 
Being consistent with Brian, James and George (2008) and going against prior 
academic theories, our results show that for both industries accruals management 
seldom add value. Earnings management does create value for mature industries like 
pharmaceutical industry, but only to the extent the real cash flow volatility it reduces. 
We also detected one potential logic problem which could be used to explain the 
distinctions between traditional theoretical framework and our study. 
 
Our results also show that the introducing of new variables like tax rate and interest 
expenses do not improve the regression model and the new variables are not 
significant. However, this could not directly deny the effects of tax rate and interest 
payments due to the characteristics of our samples. For recent ten years, lots of 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms reported net losses, which would lead to 
zero tax liability. This makes us hard to detect tax rate’s real impact on firm value. For 
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interest payments, since most of pharmaceutical companies are generally cash rich, 
interest payments hardly create financial distress and thus this variable won’t have 
significant influence on firm value and won’t be valued by investors. While for 
biotechnology companies, it is generally hard for firms to finance for its growth 
options from internal resources and they will usually turn to borrow money to 
finance its research and developments and thus investors also do not take this into 
consideration during valuation. This could also be used to explain why the variable 
leverage is also not significant for both industries. Although these two new variables 
are insignificant in our study, whether this is generally right for all other industries 
need further researches. 
 
Our work suggests that, generally, accruals management do not create value while 
cash flow volatility is not always value destruction. As a result, the study also 
contributes to risk management literatures and suggests that the real impact of cash 
flow volatility should be checked on an industry basis, and it could be more 
important for managers of companies within mature industries to focus more on real 
cash flow managements. We also identified some knowledge gaps lying in this field 
which suggest further researches on this topic, especially studies basing on other 
industries in order to achieve an integrated view of cash flow volatilities’ influences 
on firms with different growth options. 
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Q TOTAL_ASSETS EPS CFPS SYS_RISK IDIO_RISK ABS_E_V ABS_CF_V G_SALES_ ROA CAPEX_SALES R_D_SALES SGA_SALES LEVERAGE INTERESTS TAX_RATE
Q 1
TOTAL_ASSETS -0.047261 1
EPS -0.064754 0.217758 1
CFPS -0.070324 0.367649 0.735231 1
SYS_RISK -0.067316 0.157952 0.061335 0.086395 1
IDIO_RISK 0.274914 -0.050033 -0.027167 -0.062749 -0.02077 1
ABS_E_V -0.019735 -0.028816 0.046528 -0.00304 0.024874 -0.014213 1
ABS_CF_V -0.036495 -0.056053 0.020435 0.026426 0.051857 -0.008905 0.061281 1
G_SALES_ 0.000204 -0.012303 0.003471 -0.007351 -0.004521 -0.005513 -0.002435 -0.000253 1
ROA -0.235677 0.128101 0.12717 0.221303 0.118586 -0.060547 0.01842 0.042069 0.065779 1
CAPEX_SALES 0.018497 -0.021658 -0.024827 -0.053653 -0.030592 -0.00766 -0.010001 -0.020013 -0.003481 -0.341607 1
R_D_SALES 0.050183 -0.01942 -0.009539 -0.031199 -0.012775 -0.00369 -0.008115 -0.017518 -0.003062 -0.412507 0.642974 1
SGA_SALES 0.061919 -0.022152 -0.008307 -0.031795 -0.019336 -0.002486 -0.009618 -0.02002 -0.003528 -0.432137 0.836374 0.954802 1
LEVERAGE 0.032222 -0.011148 -0.068949 -0.039955 -0.012959 -0.004394 -0.003862 -0.013096 -0.002399 -0.065482 0.027884 0.041138 0.040543 1
INTERESTS 0.090152 -0.014837 -0.010697 -0.020729 0.00243 0.000936 -0.007012 -0.012384 -0.002422 -0.354379 0.615097 0.84082 0.855289 0.04903 1
TAX_RATE -0.015697 0.063657 0.035043 0.080534 0.004417 -0.018711 -0.027158 -0.037808 -0.003886 0.000557 -0.006205 -0.006195 -0.006799 -0.003804 -0.004684 1
Appendix 1.1 – Pearson Correlation Examination: Pharmaceutical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1.2 – Pearson Correlation Examination: Biotechnology 
 
 
 
Q TOTAL_ASSETS EPS CFPS SYS_RISK IDIO_RISK ABS_E_V ABS_CF_V G_SALES_ ROA CAPEX_SALES R_D_SALES SGA_SALES LEVERAGE INTERESTS TAX_RATE
Q 1
TOTAL_ASSETS -0.05174 1
EPS -0.031954 0.075815 1
CFPS -0.035302 0.112384 0.93461 1
SYS_RISK 0.014672 0.064121 -0.03357 -0.021453 1
IDIO_RISK 0.439506 -0.117569 0.018671 0.005253 -0.00843 1
ABS_E_V -0.00066 -0.010062 0.000515 -4.85E-05 0.079055 -0.022883 1
ABS_CF_V -0.020139 0.054383 0.025695 0.029145 -0.051191 -0.03994 -0.009019 1
G_SALES_ -0.012617 -0.01662 -0.002609 -0.000418 0.060187 -0.007721 -0.002658 -0.009658 1
ROA -0.645521 0.159714 0.101586 0.088019 0.093979 -0.44665 -0.012057 0.04094 -0.027345 1
CAPEX_SALES -0.011969 -0.015216 -0.000123 0.001005 0.004607 0.088842 -0.007031 -0.009486 -0.006067 -0.019861 1
R_D_SALES 0.005395 -0.030521 -0.038442 -0.041388 -0.019175 0.024043 -0.010047 -0.014391 -0.014932 -0.056504 0.316086 1
SGA_SALES 0.021539 -0.036717 -0.047766 -0.051068 -0.030099 0.062305 -0.012102 -0.017065 -0.016597 -0.086286 0.38934 0.972148 1
LEVERAGE -0.006098 -0.012096 0.008585 0.007143 -0.008925 -0.030713 -0.006967 -0.006127 -0.005172 -0.004331 3.60E-05 0.006381 0.006126 1
INTERESTS 0.063623 -0.023747 -0.175481 -0.18042 -0.010911 0.085907 -0.007869 -0.01086 -0.010175 -0.088689 0.105848 0.263665 0.380673 -0.003939 1
TAX_RATE -0.037706 0.062463 0.038384 0.037128 -0.005625 -0.064415 -0.012979 0.004067 -0.01323 0.11058 -0.013874 -0.021207 -0.025104 -0.0092 -0.015577 1
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Appendix 2.1 – Regression 1.1 (Pharmaceutical) 
 
 
Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 590 
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LN_ASSETS_ 0.066918 0.035526 1.88361 0.0601 
G_SALES_ -9.24E-05 0.000201 -0.459864 0.6458 
ROA -0.003826 0.002419 -1.581502 0.1143 
CAPEX_SALES -0.034184 0.055942 -0.611054 0.5414 
R_D_SALES -0.001466 0.005093 -0.287796 0.7736 
SGA_SALES 0.001996 0.004309 0.463285 0.6433 
LEVERAGE 9.52E-05 5.79E-05 1.642844 0.101 
C -3.780265 0.435624 -8.677813 0 
     R-squared 0.021466    Mean dependent var -2.937322 
Adjusted R-squared 0.009697     S.D. dependent var 2.385415 
S.E. of regression 2.373822     Akaike info criterion 4.580346 
Sum squared resid 3279.587     Schwarz criterion 4.639738 
Log likelihood -1343.202     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.603483 
F-statistic 1.823894     Durbin-Watson stat 0.392956 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.080211 
   
 
 
Note: Only variables stand for firms’ characteristics are used. 
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Appendix 2.2 – Regression 1.2 (Pharmaceutical) 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_Q_ 
    Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/21/11   Time: 
19:43 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 582 
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LN_SYS_RISK_ -0.045638 0.054066 -0.844113 0.399 
LN_IDIO_RISK_ 0.39138 0.122855 3.185715 0.0015 
LN_ASSETS_ 0.251304 0.068561 3.665414 0.0003 
G_SALES_ -6.49E-05 0.000201 -0.323074 0.7468 
ROA -0.003601 0.002435 -1.478781 0.1397 
CAPEX_SALES -0.053698 0.056956 -0.942796 0.3462 
R_D_SALES -0.003331 0.00518 -0.643155 0.5204 
SGA_SALES 0.003657 0.00439 0.833138 0.4051 
LEVERAGE 8.94E-05 5.79E-05 1.544558 0.123 
C -3.398679 0.519203 -6.545949 0 
     R-squared 0.038486    Mean dependent var -2.941614 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023357     S.D. dependent var 2.398923 
S.E. of regression 2.370742     Akaike info criterion 4.581316 
Sum squared resid 3214.879     Schwarz criterion 4.656341 
Log likelihood -1323.163     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.610561 
F-statistic 2.543882     Durbin-Watson stat 0.411062 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007198 
   
 
 
Note: Variables stand for firms’ characteristics and variables stand for 
systematic and idiosyncratic risks are used. 
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Appendix 2.3 – Regression 1.3 (Pharmaceutical) 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_QL_ 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/21/11   Time: 17:38 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 569 
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LN_CF_VOL_ -0.08879 0.03146 -2.822269 0.0049 
LN_SYS_RISK_ 0.003733 0.024994 0.149352 0.8813 
LN_IDIO_RISK_ 0.286527 0.056658 5.057149 0 
LN_ASSETS_ 0.066137 0.031803 2.079614 0.038 
G_SALES_ 0.000102 9.13E-05 1.117484 0.2643 
ROA -0.002822 0.001132 -2.492531 0.013 
CAPEX_SALES -0.058835 0.025935 -2.268539 0.0237 
R_D_SALES -0.004224 0.002358 -1.791541 0.0737 
SGA_SALES 0.003983 0.001999 1.993143 0.0467 
LEVERAGE 3.44E-05 2.63E-05 1.306689 0.1919 
C 0.131773 0.24062 0.547641 0.5842 
     R-squared 0.118457    Mean dependent var -0.881125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102659     S.D. dependent var 1.137605 
S.E. of regression 1.077632     Akaike info criterion 3.006551 
Sum squared resid 647.9997     Schwarz criterion 3.090528 
Log likelihood -844.3638     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.039319 
F-statistic 7.498136     Durbin-Watson stat 0.33987 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
 
Note: Both variables stand for firms’ characteristics and firms’ risks are 
used. Cash flow volatility included. 
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Appendix 2.4 – Regression 1.4 (Pharmaceutical) 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_QL_ 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/21/11   Time: 17:39 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 569 
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LN_CF_VOL_ -0.088411 0.031515 -2.805381 0.0052 
LN_SYS_RISK_ 0.003251 0.025072 0.129659 0.8969 
LN_IDIO_RISK_ 0.28831 0.057053 5.053381 0 
LN_ASSETS_ 0.067182 0.032042 2.096694 0.0365 
G_SALES_ 0.000102 9.14E-05 1.114988 0.2653 
ROA -0.002769 0.001148 -2.411412 0.0162 
CAPEX_SALES -0.066212 0.03677 -1.800713 0.0723 
R_D_SALES -0.004822 0.003166 -1.522871 0.1284 
SGA_SALES 0.004598 0.002952 1.557701 0.1199 
LEVERAGE 3.47E-05 2.64E-05 1.31504 0.189 
INTERESTS -0.00112 0.003953 -0.283266 0.7771 
C 0.131436 0.240821 0.545783 0.5854 
     R-squared 0.118584    Mean dependent var -0.881125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.101178     S.D. dependent var 1.137605 
S.E. of regression 1.078521     Akaike info criterion 3.009922 
Sum squared resid 647.9064     Schwarz criterion 3.101533 
Log likelihood -844.3228     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.045669 
F-statistic 6.812546     Durbin-Watson stat 0.339132 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
Note: New variable “annual interest payments” is added. 
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Appendix 2.5 – Regression 1.5 (Pharmaceutical) 
Dependent Variable: LN_QL_ 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/22/11   Time: 01:35 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 569 
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
TAX_RATE 0.003272 0.070877 0.046169 0.9632 
LN_CF_VOL_ -0.088682 0.031575 -2.808654 0.0051 
LN_SYS_RISK_ 0.003754 0.02502 0.15002 0.8808 
LN_IDIO_RISK_ 0.286575 0.056718 5.052624 0 
LN_ASSETS_ 0.06611 3.18E-02 2.07653 0.0383 
G_SALES_ 0.000102 9.14E-05 1.116487 0.2647 
ROA -0.002822 0.001133 -2.490106 0.0131 
CAPEX_SALES -0.058825 0.025959 -2.266087 0.0238 
R_D_SALES -0.004223 0.00236 -1.789575 0.0741 
SGA_SALES 3.98E-03 2.00E-03 1.991013 0.047 
LEVERAGE 3.44E-05 2.64E-05 1.305761 0.1922 
C 0.132302 0.241108 0.548727 0.5834 
     R-squared 0.118461    Mean dependent var -0.881125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.101052     S.D. dependent var 1.137605 
S.E. of regression 1.078596     Akaike info criterion 3.010062 
Sum squared resid 647.9972     Schwarz criterion 3.101673 
Log likelihood -844.3627     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.045809 
F-statistic 6.804491     Durbin-Watson stat 0.339603 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
Note: New variable “effective tax rate” is added. 
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Appendix 3.1 – Regression 2.1 (Pharmaceutical) 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_QL_ 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/21/11   Time: 17:51 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 555 
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LN_E_VOL_ -0.073804 0.034353 -2.148412 0.0321 
LN_SYS_RISK_ 0.003778 0.02606 0.144989 0.8848 
LN_IDIO_RISK_ 0.280771 0.058188 4.825276 0 
LN_ASSETS_ 0.075557 0.032851 2.299992 0.0218 
G_SALES_ 0.000101 9.29E-05 1.089138 0.2766 
ROA -0.002741 0.001185 -2.313381 0.0211 
CAPEX_SALES -0.05611 0.026391 -2.12612 0.0339 
R_D_SALES -0.003997 0.0024 -1.665589 0.0964 
SGA_SALES 0.003808 0.002035 1.870586 0.0619 
LEVERAGE 3.99E-05 2.68E-05 1.491415 0.1364 
C -0.002228 0.250004 -0.00891 0.9929 
     R-squared 0.106187    Mean dependent var -0.900778 
Adjusted R-squared 0.089757     S.D. dependent var 1.148811 
S.E. of regression 1.096043     Akaike info criterion 3.04091 
Sum squared resid 653.5123     Schwarz criterion 3.126511 
Log likelihood -832.8525     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.074348 
F-statistic 6.462864     Durbin-Watson stat 0.325818 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
 
Note: Earnings volatility is included. 
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Appendix 3.2 – Regression 2.2 (Pharmaceutical) 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_QL_ 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/22/11   Time: 15:26 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 556 
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LN_CF_VOL_ -0.08556 0.04176 -2.048863 0.041 
LN_ACC_VOL_ -0.007566 0.038904 -0.194483 0.8459 
LN_SYS_RISK_ 0.000519 0.025339 0.020463 0.9837 
LN_IDIO_RISK_ 0.260639 0.057322 4.546911 0 
LN_ASSETS_ 0.064182 0.032301 1.987 0.0474 
G_SALES_ 0.000104 9.07E-05 1.148525 0.2513 
ROA -0.00303 0.00114 -2.657855 0.0081 
CAPEX_SALES -0.059398 0.025763 -2.305553 0.0215 
R_D_SALES -0.004275 0.002342 -1.825159 0.0685 
SGA_SALES 0.004018 0.001985 2.023836 0.0435 
LEVERAGE 3.58E-05 2.62E-05 1.366713 0.1723 
C -0.034213 0.246859 -0.138595 0.8898 
     R-squared 0.110868    Mean dependent var -0.886548 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092889     S.D. dependent var 1.122779 
S.E. of regression 1.069361     Akaike info criterion 2.993346 
Sum squared resid 622.0816     Schwarz criterion 3.0866 
Log likelihood -8.20E+02     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.02977 
F-statistic 6.166614     Durbin-Watson stat 0.341946 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
 
Note: Earnings volatility is removed, cash flow volatility and accruals 
volatility are added. 
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Appendix 3.3 – Regression 2.3 (Pharmaceutical) 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_QL_ 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/21/11   Time: 17:53 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 569 
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LN_CF_VOL_ -0.08879 0.03146 -2.822269 0.0049 
LN_SYS_RISK_ 0.003733 0.024994 0.149352 0.8813 
LN_IDIO_RISK_ 0.286527 0.056658 5.057149 0 
LN_ASSETS_ 0.066137 0.031803 2.079614 0.038 
G_SALES_ 0.000102 9.13E-05 1.117484 0.2643 
ROA -0.002822 0.001132 -2.492531 0.013 
CAPEX_SALES -0.058835 0.025935 -2.268539 0.0237 
R_D_SALES -0.004224 0.002358 -1.791541 0.0737 
SGA_SALES 0.003983 0.001999 1.993143 0.0467 
LEVERAGE 3.44E-05 2.63E-05 1.306689 0.1919 
C 0.131773 0.24062 0.547641 0.5842 
     R-squared 0.118457    Mean dependent var -0.881125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102659     S.D. dependent var 1.137605 
S.E. of regression 1.077632     Akaike info criterion 3.006551 
Sum squared resid 647.9997     Schwarz criterion 3.090528 
Log likelihood -844.3638     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.039319 
F-statistic 7.498136     Durbin-Watson stat 0.33987 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
 
Note: Accruals volatility is removed. 
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Appendix 4.1 – Regression 3.3 (Pharmaceutical, Robustness Test) 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_QL_ 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/21/11   Time: 17:58 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 577 
   
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LN_CF_VOL_ -0.0984 0.031376 -3.136153 0.0018 
LN_IDIO_RISK_ 0.300069 0.055105 5.445393 0 
LN_ASSETS_ 0.066558 0.029526 2.254215 0.0246 
ROA -0.002777 0.001086 -2.556703 0.0108 
CAPEX_SALES -0.069411 0.024426 -2.841733 0.0046 
R_D_SALES -0.005182 0.002217 -2.337952 0.0197 
SGA_SALES 0.004805 0.001883 2.552302 0.011 
C 0.211694 0.21768 0.972501 0.3312 
     R-squared 0.135023    Mean dependent var -0.869672 
Adjusted R-squared 0.124382     S.D. dependent var 1.155833 
S.E. of regression 1.081565     Akaike info criterion 3.008462 
Sum squared resid 665.6059     Schwarz criterion 3.068883 
Log likelihood -859.9413     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.032024 
F-statistic 12.68871     Durbin-Watson stat 0.350267 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
 
Note: Cash flow volatility is included. Insignificant variables are removed. 
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Appendix 4.2 – Regression 4.2 (Pharmaceutical, Robustness Test) 
 
Dependent Variable: LN_QL_ 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/22/11   Time: 15:27 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 70 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 569 
   White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
 
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LN_CF_VOL_ -0.098187 0.032758 -2.997345 0.0028 
LN_SYS_RISK_ -0.007256 0.028816 -0.251791 0.8013 
LN_IDIO_RISK_ 0.284648 0.110593 2.573842 0.0103 
LN_ASSETS_ 0.063401 0.057753 1.097798 0.2728 
G_SALES_ 9.92E-05 1.79E-05 5.530587 0 
ROA -0.002798 0.001402 -1.995593 0.0465 
CAPEX_SALES -0.05444 0.034024 -1.600064 0.1102 
R_D_SALES -0.003839 0.003083 -1.245143 0.2136 
SGA_SALES 0.003663 0.002618 1.399202 0.1623 
LEVERAGE 2.96E-05 1.46E-05 2.024559 0.0434 
C 0.129006 0.311686 0.413897 0.6791 
     Effects Specification 
    Period fixed (dummy variables) 
   
     R-squared 0.127309    Mean dependent var -0.881125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.098748     S.D. dependent var 1.137605 
S.E. of regression 1.079977     Akaike info criterion 3.024579 
Sum squared resid 641.4931     Schwarz criterion 3.169629 
Log likelihood -841.4927     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.081178 
F-statistic 4.457476     Durbin-Watson stat 0.336845 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
Note: Cash flow volatility is included. White (diagonal) method is used. 
Time Period is fixed. 
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Appendix 5.1 – Regression 5.1 (Biotechnology, Robustness Test) 
 
Dependent Variable: COR_M_B 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/22/11   Time: 23:11 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 83 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 502 
   White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
 
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
COR_SYS_RISK -0.029071 0.024011 -1.210741 0.2267 
COR_IDO_RISK 0.059681 0.052023 1.14721 0.252 
COR_LN_ASSETS_ -0.413726 0.077576 -5.333165 0 
COR_G_SALES 0.00015 0.000652 0.230039 0.8182 
COR_ROA_2 -0.246344 0.083536 -2.948972 0.0034 
COR_CAPEX_SALES 0.001191 0.000538 2.216071 0.0272 
COR_R_D_SALES 0.001447 0.000302 4.796695 0 
COR_SGA_SALES -0.001247 0.000259 -4.814972 0 
COR_D_E 4.76E-06 4.07E-06 1.169279 0.243 
COR_VOL_E -0.002281 0.005176 -0.440642 0.6597 
C 4.286168 0.906299 4.729309 0 
     Effects Specification 
    Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
   Period fixed (dummy variables) 
   
     R-squared 0.746927    Mean dependent var -0.879522 
Adjusted R-squared 0.683816     S.D. dependent var 1.028909 
S.E. of regression 0.578557     Akaike info criterion 1.921194 
Sum squared resid 134.2262     Schwarz criterion 2.769956 
Log likelihood -381.2197     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.25419 
F-statistic 11.83522     Durbin-Watson stat 1.069155 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
Note: Earnings volatility is included.  
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Appendix 5.2 – Regression 5.2 (Biotechnology, Robustness Test) 
 
Dependent Variable: COR_M_B 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/22/11   Time: 23:13 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 83 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 502 
   White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
 
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
COR_SYS_RISK -0.026399 0.023786 -1.10988 0.2677 
COR_IDO_RISK 0.057652 0.051175 1.12656 0.2606 
COR_LN_ASSETS_ -0.41894 0.077774 -5.386636 0 
COR_G_SALES 0.000194 0.000689 0.281357 0.7786 
COR_ROA_2 -0.239656 0.0845 -2.836157 0.0048 
COR_CAPEX_SALES 0.001147 0.000557 2.057448 0.0403 
COR_R_D_SALES 0.001432 0.000316 4.53265 0 
COR_SGA_SALES -0.001226 0.000268 -4.579957 0 
COR_D_E 4.83E-06 4.08E-06 1.184635 0.2369 
COR_VOL_CF 0.009713 0.005972 1.626477 0.1046 
COR_ACC 0.009267 0.0197 0.470388 0.6383 
C 4.344267 0.911 4.76868 0 
     Effects Specification 
    Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
   Period fixed (dummy variables) 
   
     R-squared 0.748117    Mean dependent var -0.879522 
Adjusted R-squared 0.684516     S.D. dependent var 1.028909 
S.E. of regression 0.577917     Akaike info criterion 1.920465 
Sum squared resid 133.595     Schwarz criterion 2.77763 
Log likelihood -380.0366     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.256758 
F-statistic 11.76276     Durbin-Watson stat 1.086668 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
Note: Earnings volatility is removed. Cash flow volatility and accruals 
volatility are added. 
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Appendix 5.3 – Regression 5.3 (Biotechnology, Robustness Test) 
 
Dependent Variable: COR_M_B 
   Method: Panel Least Squares 
   Date: 05/22/11   Time: 22:15 
    Sample: 2002 2010 
    Periods included: 9 
    Cross-sections included: 83 
    Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 502 
   White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
 
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
COR_VOL_CF 0.009694 0.006005 1.614388 0.1072 
COR_SYS_RISK -0.025262 0.023749 -1.063689 0.2881 
COR_IDO_RISK 0.059405 0.051523 1.152971 0.2496 
COR_LN_ASSETS_ -0.417163 0.07757 -5.377884 0 
COR_G_SALES 8.77E-05 0.000642 0.136626 0.8914 
COR_ROA_2 -0.243377 0.083614 -2.910734 0.0038 
COR_CAPEX_SALES 0.001196 0.000537 2.227758 0.0265 
COR_R_D_SALES 0.001468 0.000301 4.879639 0 
COR_SGA_SALES -0.001256 0.000257 -4.883755 0 
COR_D_E 4.76E-06 4.06E-06 1.17462 0.2408 
C 4.334323 0.907381 4.776741 0 
     Effects Specification 
    Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
   Period fixed (dummy variables) 
   
     R-squared 0.747982    Mean dependent var -0.879522 
Adjusted R-squared 0.685135     S.D. dependent var 1.028909 
S.E. of regression 0.57735     Akaike info criterion 1.917016 
Sum squared resid 133.6666     Schwarz criterion 2.765778 
Log likelihood -380.171     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.250012 
F-statistic 11.90156     Durbin-Watson stat 1.085111 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
   
 
Note: accruals volatility is removed. 
